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NOTES
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE FOR RAPE CRISIS
COUNSELING: A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS VERSUS A
RAPE VICTIM'S RIGHT TO CONFIDENTIAL
THERAPEUTIC COUNSELING
"Rapist—
The true nature of your crime—
You left me alive."'
Only a rape victim herself will ever know the horror of rape, a
horror that never dies, but haunts a victim for life. A total violation
of the individual and an intensely personal intrusion into one's
privacy, rape leaves physical, psychological and emotional scars on
a victim. 2
 Professional counselors and psychiatrists use the term
"rape trauma syndrome" to characterize the wide range of emo-
tional and psychological reactions rape victims experience.3 Rape
crisis centers have developed rapidly to help victims of rape recover
from its severe :adverse effects.' Rape crisis centers provide thera-
peutic counseling to victims through counselors who are specifically
trained to help women recover from rape trauma syndrome.'
Recognizing the pervasive needs of a rape victim and the im-
portant services rape crisis centers perform, several states, either
I Excerpt from a poem written by an anonymous rape victim.
' In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 38-39, 428 A.2d 126, 138 (1981)
(Larsen, J., dissenting).
See id at 38-39, 428 A.2d at 138. For a general discussion of rape trauma syndrome,
see A. BURGESS & L. HOLSTROM, RAPE: CRISIS AND RECOVERY 33-47 (1979); E. HILBiRMAN,
THE RAPE VICTIM 36-39 (1976).
See In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 58, 428 A.2d at 148 (Larsen, J., dissenting); HILBERMAN,
.supra note 3, at 29-32.
5 HILBERMAN, supra note 3, at 29-32, 41-48 (1976).
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judicially or statutorily, have extended a testimonial privilege to
communications arising from the counseling relationship. 6 These
privileges protect the confidentiality of communications between a
rape victim and her counselor. Defendants in rape cases, however,
have challenged these privileges as unconstitutional. They have
claimed that an absolute denial of relevant information and poten-
tial exculpatory evidence violates their right . to a fair trial and their
rights guaranteed by the confrontation clause and compulsory pro-
cess clause of the sixth amendment.' Consequently, several courts
have confronted the conflict between a testimonial privilege for the
rape counseling relationship and a defendant's sixth amendment
rights, and have considered the issue of the constitutionality of an
absolute privilege for communications between a rape victim and a
rape crisis counselor. 8
Testimonial privileges guarantee the confidentiality of com-
munications arising out of particular relationships by allowing par-
ticipants to refuse to reveal the contents of communications if called
to testify in a court of Iaw. 9 Unlike most exclusionary rules of
evidence which are designed to exclude' unreliable or prejudicial
evidence, the operation of a testimonial privilege often results in
the exclusion of probative evidence from a trial.'° Testimonial priv-
6 For statutorily extended privileges for rape counseling, see CAL. Eva). CODE §§ 1035-
1036 (West Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52.146k (West Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch . 110, para. 8-802.1 (Smith-Hurd 1984); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 233, § 20J
(1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02( J) (West Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84(A)-22.11-
22.12 (West Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5945.1 (Pardon 1982); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 70.125.065 (Supp. 1987). For judicially extended protection for rape counseling, see
In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. 15, 428 A.2d 126; People v, Pena, 487 N.Y.S.2d 935, 127 Mile. 2d
1057 (1985).
7 See In re Robert H., 199 Conn. 693, 706-07, 509 A.2d 475, 483 (1986) (defendant
claimed violation of his rights under the confrontation and compulsbry process clauses of
the sixth amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); People v.
Foggy, 121 Il1.2d 337, 342, 521 N.E.2d 86, 88 (1988) (defendant claimed violation of rights
to due process under the fourteenth amendment and his right to confrontation under the
sixth amendment); Commonwealth v. Samuels, 354 Pa. Super. 128, 139-40, 511 A.2d 221,
226-27 (1986) (defendant claimed violation of his rights under the due process clause or the
fourteenth amendment and the compulsory process clauses of the sixth amendment).
" See, e.g., Robert H., 199 Conn. at 706, 509 A.2d at 483; Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles,
397 Mass. 261, 262, 491 N.E.2d 234, 235 (1986); Foggy, 121 Ill.2d at 339-42, 521 N.E.2d at
87-88.
9 See infra notes 20 and 21 for examples of testimonial privileges. See also Note, Defendant
v. Witness: Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory Communications
Privileges, STAN. L. REV. 935, 939 (1978).
1 °C. McCoRmIcx, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (3d ed. 1984); Louissell, Confidentiality,
Conformity and Confusion; Privileges in Federal Courts Today, 31 Tut... L. Rev. 101, 110-11
(1956).
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ileges promote relationships that society considers valuable. Accord-
ingly, the continued existence of these valuable relationships justifies
the exclusion of even the most relevant and competent evidence."
Commentators have classified the social objectives that justify the
existence of privileges under two theories: the public function the-
ory and the private function theory. 12 The public function theory
focuses upon the societal importance of the relationship," whereas
the private function view concentrates upon the individual's private
interests in the relationship and in the confidentiality of the com-
munications."
The testimonial privilege for communications between a rape
victim and a rape crisis counselor assures confidentiality within a
therapeutic counseling relationship designed to help victims recover
from the trauma rape inflicts.'-"' This privilege promotes two social
goals: the rehabilitation of rape victims and the prosecution of
rapists.' 6 The privilege for rape counseling also promotes the vic-
tim's private interests in the relationship. A victim possesses a pri-
vacy interest in the relationship and an interest in receiving effective
and sensitive counseling to enable her to recover from the psycho-
logical, emotional and social injuries that rape inflicts."
Although two courts have created privileges for the rape coun-
seling relationship by extending the common law,l 8 in most states
the privilege is codified by statute.w The statutes differ in the degree
and the extent of confidentiality they afford to such communica-
tions. Some statutory privileges are qualified and allow disclosure
of communications in court only after the defendant and the court
conform with specific procedures. 2° A number of statutes, however,
11 C. McCoRsitex, supra note 10, § 72; Note, supra note 9, at 940.
IS Note, supra note 9, at 940-44; see C. McCoRmicK, supra note 10, § 72.
' 3 C. McCoummx, supra note 10, § 72; Note, supra note 9, at 941.
14 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 72; Note, supra note 9, at 943; Louissell, supra note
10, at 110-11; Krattentnaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the
Proposed Federal Rules, 62 Git.o. L.J. 61, 85-94 (1973); also Sall zburg, Privileges and Professionals,
66 VA. L. REV. 597 (1980); Black, The Marital and Physician Privileges— Reprint of a Letter to a
Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 47.
15 See infra notes 79-99 and accompanying text.
16 In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 24, 428 A.2d 126, 130 (1981); People
v. Foggy, 121 111.2d 337, 348, 521 N.E.2d 86, 91 (1988).
17 See, e.g., In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 60-62, 428 A.2d at 149-50 (Larsen, J., dissenting);
In re Robert H., 199 Conn. 693, 706, 509 A.2d 475, 483 (1976).
1 " See In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 28, 428 A.2d at 132; People v. Pena, 487 N.Y.S.2d 935,
939, 127 Misc. 2d 1057, 1061-62 (1985).
"'See supra note 6 fOr a list of statutory testimonial privileges for rape counseling.
"See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1035-1036 (West Supp. 1988); WASII. REV. CODE ANN.
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afford an absolute privilege of confidentiality to the rape crisis
counseling relationship. Such statutes protect the confidentiality of
communications absolutely, without exception, and do not permit
disclosure under any 'circumstances. 21 Because absolute privilege
§ 70.125.065 (Supp. 1987). Section 1035.4 of the California Evidence Code provides an
example of a statutory qualified privilege and the procedures, such as the in camera review
of the communications by the trial judge, employed to allow limited.disclosure of confidential
communications. Section 1035.4, entitled Confidential Communications Between the Sexual Assault
Counselor and the Victim; Disclosure, states in part:
The court may compel disclosure of information received by the sexual assault
counselor which constitutes relevant evidence of the facts and circumstances
involving an alleged sexual assault about which the victim is complaining and
which is the subject of a criminal proceeding if the court determines that the
probative value outweighs the effect on the victim, the treatment relationship,
and the treatment services if disclosure is compelled ....
When a court is ruling on a claim of privilege under this article, the court
may require the person from whom disclosure is sought or the person autho-
rized to claim the privilege, or both, to disclose the information in chambers
out of the presence and hearing of all persons except the person authorized to
claim the privilege .... If the judge determines that the information is privi-
leged and must not be disclosed, neither he or she ... may ever disclose ...
without consent .. what was disclosed in the course of the proceedings in
chambers.
If the court determines certain information shall be disclosed, the court
shall so order and inform the defendant. If the court finds there is a reasonable
likelihood that particular information is subject to disclosure pursuant to the
balancing test provided in this section, the following procedure shall be fol-
lowed:
(1) The court shall inform the defendant of the nature of the information
which may be subject to disclosure.
(2) The court shall order a hearing out of the presence of the jury ... and
at the hearing allow the questioning of the sexual assault counselor regarding
the information ....
(3) At the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall rule which items of
information, if any, shall be disclosed. The court may make an order stating
what evidence may be introduced by the defendant and the nature of questions
to be permitted. The defendant may then offer evidence pursuant to the order
of the court
Id.
2 ' See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146k (West Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 110,
para. 8-802.1 (Smith-Hurd 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, 20J (1986); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84(A)-22.11-22.12 (West Supp.
1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5945.1 (Purdon 1982). Massachusetts General Laws provide
an example of an absolute statutory privilege that precludes even an in camera review. The
section entitled Privileged Communications Between Sexual Assault Victim and Certain Counselors
provides in relevant part:
A sexual assault counselor shall not disclose such confidential communication,
without the prior written consent of the victim; provided, however, that nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to limit the defendant's right of cross-exam-
ination of such counselor in a civil or criminal trial if such counselor testifies
with such written consent. Such confidential communications shall not be subject
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statutes, unlike qualified privilege statutes, prohibit defense access
to privileged communications under all circumstances, defendants
have challenged these absolute statutes as unconstitutional. 22
Defendants charged with rape have asserted that an absolute
privilege shielding communications between a rape victim and her
counselor from the defendants' view, and consequently from poten-
tial use as exculpatory evidence, unconstitutionally deprive them of
their rights under the confrontation and compulsory process clauses
of the sixth amendment." The sixth amendment of the United
States Constitution provides that the accused in a criminal prose-
cution "shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor ...." 24
 These clauses are referred to respectively
as the confrontation clause and the compulsory process clause.
Courts have interpreted the confrontation clause to secure for
a criminal defendant the right of cross-examination." Defendants
who have confronted a testimonial privilege for communications
between a victim-complainant and her counselor have alleged that,
because the victim may have made inconsistent statements to her
counselor, they must be permitted access to such statements in order
to cross-examine the victim effectively. Denial of access to the com-
munications because of the absolute privilege, defendants have as-
serted, is a violation of their right to confront witnesses against
them. 2" in addition, defendantS have maintained that an absolute
to discovery and shall be inadmissible in any criminal or civil proceeding without
the prior Written consent of the victim to whom the report, record, working
paper or memorandum relates.
111.
" See, e.g., In re Robert H., 199 Conn. 693, 699-700, 509 A.2d 475, 480 (1986); People
v, Foggy, 121 111.2d 337, 342, 521 N.E.2d 86, 88 (1988). See infra notes 252-341 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these challenges.
23 See, e.g., Robert H., 199 Conn. at 706-07, 509 A.2d at 483; Foggy, 121 111,2d at 342,
521 N.E.2d at 88; Commonwealth v. Samuels, 354 l'a. Super. 128, 139-40, 511 A.2d 221,
226-27 (1986).
24
 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment states in full:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
Id.
25
 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1971). See infra notes 132-203 and accompanying
text.
21 See, e.g., Robert H., 199 Conn. at 706-07, 509 A.2d at 483; Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d at 342,
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privilege violates' their compulsory process rights because it pre-
cludes them from calling the rape crisis counselor, a potentially
favorable witness, to the stand and prohibits them from introducing
potentially exculpatory evidence contained in the counselor's files. 27
The United States Supreme Court decisions regarding the con-
frontation and compulsory process clauses do not precisely delin-
eate the defendant's rights under these clauses.28 Although the
Court ruled that the confrontation clause guaranteed a right of
cross-examination, not until 1974, in Davis v. Alaska, did the Court
address what constituted adequate cross-examination under the
confrontation clause. 29 Furthermore, the Supreme Court itself is
divided as to the meaning of a right of effective cross-examination."
The plurality opinion in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie limited the right of
a defendant to effective cross-examination by asserting that this
right is only infringed upon where the actual questioning at trial is
restricted. 3 ' The dissent in Ritchie, however, argued that the right
of cross-examination should not be limited to a trial right, but
should include a right to pre-trial discovery of statements that may
increase the effectiveness of cross-examination."
Similarly, the Supreme Court has rarely addressed the param-
eters of the compulsory process clause." In Ritchie, where the Court
faced an alleged violation of compulsory process involving a statute
protecting the confidentiality of the files of an agency organized to
investigate child abuse, the Court chose to apply a due process
analysis to the conflict. 34 Moreover, the Court has only decided cases
involving claims of conflict between a defendant's sixth amendment
rights and various evidentiary rules of exclusion." The Supreme
Court has never decided a conflict between a defendant's sixth
521 N.E.2d at 88; cf. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 998-99 (confidentiality of child abuse records). See
infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Robert H., 199 Conn. at 706-07, 509 A.2d at 483 (1986); cf. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct.
at 995; See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
28 See Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989. The Court was unable to reach a majority on the interpre-
tation of the confrontation clause. Id. at 994. Moreover, the Court stated that its precedents
on the compulsory process clause were "unsettled." Id. at 1001.
2" Davis, 415 U.S. at 315; see infra notes 135-57 and accompanying text.
" See Ritchie, 107 S. Ct 989 (plurality opinion). See infra notes 158-203 and accompanying
text.
Id. at 1000.
72 See id. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id, at 1001.
34 Id.
"See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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amendment rights and a . testimonial privilege," which rests upon a
different foundation than a rule of exclusion.' 7 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the defendant's rights
under the confrontation and compulsory process clauses and the
proper resolution to a conflict between a defendant's rights and a
testimonial privilege for rape crisis counseling is unsettled and con-
fusing.
Several state courts have confronted the issue of the constitu-
tionality of an absolute rape counseling privilege." Most of these
courts have ruled that an absolute privilege statute unconstitution-
ally infringes upon a defendant's sixth amendment rights to con-
frontation and compulsory process.'" Yet, these courts reached the
same conclusion applying different reasoning and conflicting inter-
pretations of the same Supreme Court decisions.° Additionally,
these court opinions were all decided prior to the decision of Penn-
sylvania v. Ritchie, in which the Court elaborated on the right of
confrontation and applied a due process analysis where the defen-
dant claimed a violation of compulsory process.'" In contrast, one
state court held that an absolute privilege for communications be-
tween a rape victim and a rape crisis counselor was Constitutional.°
This note analyzes the constitutionality of an absolute testimon-
ial privilege for communications between a rape victim and a rape
crisis counselor. Part I reviews the law of testimonial privileges,
examines the underlying policy interests supporting the existence
of such privileges, and focuses on the absolute privilege for the rape
crisis counseling relationship and the interests the privilege pro-
tects.° Part II considers the contours and scope of the rights guar-
anteed by the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of the
sixth amendment and Supreme Court decisions resolving conflicts
36 See Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 267, 491 N.E.2d 234, 238 (1986).
37 See Washington, 388 U.S. at 23 n.21; McCoxsticx, supra note 10, § 72; Note, supra note
9, at 939-44.
" See In re Robert H., 199 Conn. 693, 706, 509 A.2d 475, 483 (1986); People v. Foggy,
121 111. 2d 337, 342, 347, 521 N.E.2d 86, 88, 91 (1988); Two Juveniles, 397 Mass, at 262, 491
N.E.2d at 235; Commonwealth v. Samuels, 354 Pa. Super. 128, 139-40, 511 A.2d 221, 226-
27 (1986); Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161, 1163 (R.I.
1983).
39 E.g., Robert H., 199 Conn. at 708-09, 509 A.2d at 484. See also the advisory opinions
in Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. '161, 491 N.E.2d 234 (1986); Advisory Opinion, 469 A,2d 1161 (R.I.
1983).
4° See infra notes 252-341 and accompanying text.
107 S. Ct. 989 (1987).
42 Foggy, 121 111, 2d at 349-50, 521 N.E.2d at 92.
." See infra notes 47-122 and accompanying text.
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with sixth amendment rights." Part III discusses the origins of the
testimonial privilege of confidentiality for the rape crisis counseling
relationship and reviews the conflicting decisions of state courts
confronted with the issue of the constitutionality of an absolute
privilege." This note concludes that an absolute privilege of confi-
dentiality for communications between rape victims and rape crisis
counselors does not violate a defendant's sixth amendment rights
because the compelling state interests and the individual private
interests of the victim supporting this testimonial privilege justify
any infringement on the defendant's rights."
I. TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES: A PRIVILEGE FOR THE RAPE CRISIS
COUNSELING RELATIONSHIP
A. Testimonial Privileges
The American system of criminal justice—adversarial in nature
and emphasizing complete disclosure of all relevant facts—funda-
mentally operates as a search for truth. The basic belief that disclo-
sure, rather than suppression, promotes the proper administration
of criminal justice' led to the emergence of the three century old
legal maxim that the public has a claim to every man's evidence."
In contradiction to this fundamental legal maxim demanding dis-
closure and imposing a testimonial duty on every man, English and
Americah law for centuries have granted testimonial privileges to
participants in certain favored private relationships."
Testimonial privileges guarantee the confidentiality of com-
munications in particular relationships by allowing participants not
to reveal the contents of their communications when called to testify
as witnesses in court. 5° At common law, privileges of confidentiality
44 See infra notes 123-251 and accompanying text.
45
 See infra notes 252-341 and accompanying text.
° See infra notes 342-445 and accompanying text.
47 In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 24, 428 A.2d 126, 130 (1981) (quoting
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S, 855, 870 (1966)).
4" 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (quoting Lord Hardwicke,
12 Coaaai-r's PARLIAMENTARY His•rmtv 675, 693 (1742)) ("When we come to examine the
various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general
duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving and that any exemptions which may
exist are distinctly exceptional ....").
"See C. McCoam tot, supra note 10, §§ 78, 87; see also Note, supra note 9, at 939.
" See C. McCoamtcx, supra note 10, § 73.
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existed for communications between attorneys and their clients''
and between husbands and wives." In the 19th century some state
legislatures began expanding the law of testimonial privileges by
creating privileges for communications between doctors and
patients" and between clergy and penitents. 54 Most recently, statutes
have extended communications privileges to therapeutic and coun-
seling relationships,55 as well as to other private relationships." The
confidentiality privilege for communications between rape crisis
counselors and rape victims is a recent creation, first created
judicially" and subsequently extended statutorily. 58
Although testimonial privileges exempt certain communica-
tions from disclosure in judicial proceedings, communications priv-
ileges are not merely exclusionary rules of evidence." Most exclu-
sionary rules of evidence are designed to promote the truth-seeking
" See Kelway v, Kelway, 21 Eng. Rep. 47 (ch. 1580); see also C. McColtmick, supra note
10, at 87-97; 8 J. WicmoRE, supra note 48, /I 2290-2329, The attorney-client privilege is
now statutory in most states. See, e.g., CAL. EVIL). CODE ft§ 950-62 (West 1966); WIS. STAT.
ANN. 905.03 (West 1975).
"See Lady Ivy's Trial, 10 How. St. Tr. 555, 628 (1684); see also C. McCoRmicK, supra
note 10, /1 78-86; 8 J. WICMORE, supra note 48, 11 2332-41 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961 and
Supp. 1977), The marital testimonial privilege is now statutory in most states. For a full
description of the privilege and a survey of statutes, see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, 1/ 78-
86; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 48,1/ 2332-41.
" See, e.g., N,Y. Rev. STATs. pt . 3, ch. 7, § 73 (1829); CAL. Cry. Pam. CouE1 1881 (1872);
see also MCCORMICK, supra note 10, at 98-105; 8 J. WicmoitE, supra note 48, 11 2380-91.
5' See N.Y. REV. STATS. pt . 3, ch. 7, 72 (1828); see also 8 J. WICMORE, supra note 48,
§ 2394.
" See CAI.. EVID. CODE §1 101 0-27 (West 1966 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. Qv. NAG. L. & R.
/1 4507-08 (McKinney 1988) (privilege extended to psychologists and social workers); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, 1/ 5944-45 (Purdon 1982) (privilege created for licensed psychologists
and school personnel). See generally Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of
Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 609 (1964); Comment, Underprivileged Commu-
nications: Extension of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege to Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers,
61 CALIF. L, Rev. 1050 (1973).
56 See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 48, § 2286 for recent communications privileges statu-
torily created for such private parties as journalists and their sources, accountants and their
clients, and clerks and stenographers arid their employers.
"In re Pittsburgh. Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 28, 428 A.2d 126, 132 (1981)
(although court refused to extend an absolute privilege, the court granted qualified protection
to communications between a rape counselor and a victim); see also People v. Pena, 487
N.Y.S.2d 935, 937-39, 127 Misc. 2d 1057, 1058-62 (1985) (the court judicially fashioned a
qualified privilege on the facts).
58 CAL. EVID. CODE §1 1035-36 (West Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 52.I46k
(West Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 110, para. 8-802.1 (Smith-Hurd 1984); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20J (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1988); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84(A)-22.11-22.12 (West Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5945.1
(Purdon 1982); WASH. Rtv. CODE ANN. § 70.125.065 (Supp. 1987).
" C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 72.
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function of our judicial system by excluding unreliable or prejudi-
cial evidence. The hearsay rule, the best evidence rule, the opinion
rule and the propensity rule exemplify such exclusionary rules.""
Unlike such exclusionary rules of evidence, the operation of a tes-
timonial privilege often results in the exclusion of probative evi-
dence from a trial."' Thus, by excluding competent evidence, tes-
timonial privileges inhibit, rather than enhance, the ascertainment
of truth." Testimonial privileges should not be viewed solely from
the perspective of their exclusionary function in litigation, how-
ever."' Rather, testimonial privileges protect extra-judicial interests
and socially important relationships."'' They reflect societal values
and social policies that justify the exclusion of even the most relevant
arid competent evidence."' The many social objectives advanced in
justification of privileges can be classified under two major theories:
the public function theory and the private function theory."
1. The Public Function Theory
Some commentators have proposed a public function theory of
communications privileges that focuses on the societal importance
of the relationship from which the communications arise.° The
theory's justification derives from Wigmore's classical analysis of
communications privileges." Although a privilege extends confi-
dentiality to the communication, the public function analysis focuses
on the relationship, the necessity of confidentiality for the promo-
tion of the relationship, the societal value of the relationship and
the potential injury to the relationship." Under the public function
66 Id.
61 Id.; Louissell, supra note 10, at 110-111.
62 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10. § 72.
Id,; Louissell, supra note 10, at 110-1 l I.
64 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 72.
°' Id.; Louissell, supra note 10, at 110-111.
66 C. McCoasucK, supra note 10, § 72; Note, supra note 9, at 940.
67 See C. McCoasucK, supra note 10, 72; Note, supra note 9, at 940-42.
68 See C. McCoRsucK, supra note 10, § 72; Note, supra note 9, at 940-41.
69 See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 48, § 2285. To determine whether a communication
merits a privilege of confidentiality, Wigmore asserts that four conditions must be satisfied:
(I) The communication must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. (3) The relation
must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered. (4) The injury that would inure to the relationship by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.
Id. (emphasis omitted)
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view, the purpose of the privilege, therefore, is the promotion,
maintenance and protection of relationships that our society con-
siders valuable:7° Thus, according to this theory, privileges are ju-
dicial instruments used to achieve important practical social aims:7 '
The public function theory rests upon the assumption that, if
individuals cannot be certain that their communications within par-
ticular relationships will remain confidential, they may choose not
to form such relationships or will refrain from communicating in
an open and honest manner necessary for the growth and proper
function of the relationship. 72 This theory does not emphasize the
individual suffering that failure of the relationship will cause, but
focuses instead on the societal harm such failure will cause. If clients
cannot freely and honestly consult with lawyers without fear of
disclosure, the judicial process itself will suffer. Similarly, if husband
and wife cannot share confidences with an assurance of secrecy,
family life may ultimately suffer. Likewise, the general health of
society may suffer if pati .ents are afraid to communicate their phys-
ical or psychological problems to their physicians or psychologists
because of potential disclosure." Accordingly, a particular privi-
lege's strength depends upon its social utility, which is measured by
the social importance of the relationship and the damage that dis-
closure would inflict upon that relationship and, ultimately, upon
society in general."
2. The Private Function Theory
Commentators have also proposed a private function theory of
privileges. This theory's justification rests upon the individual's pri-
vate interests in the relationship and in the communications' con-
fidentiality. 75 According to the private funCtion theory, communi-
cations privileges exist to guard matters of privacy and conscience
revealed in such relationships and to protect individuals from per-
"Id.; Note, supra note 9, at 941.
71 Note, supra note 9, at 941.
as Id.
73 Id.
54 Id. at 941-42.
75 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 72; Louissell, supra note 10, at 110-11. Professor
Louissell stated that "privileges of confidential communications protect significant human
values in the interest of the holders of the privileges, and that the fact that the existence of
these guarantees sometimes results in the exclusion from a trial of probative evidence is
merely a secondary and incidental feature of the privileges' vitality." Louissell, supra note 10,
at 101.
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sonal injuries that disclosure of such confidences might cause
them. 76
 The underlying notion is that privilegeholders possess rights
to secret communications within certain private relationships .and
that the legal existence of privileges is in effect recognition of these
individual rights." As one advocate of private function justifications
noted, privileges recognize "a right to be let alone, a right to un-
fettered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed relationships, from
the state's coercive or supervisory powers and from the nuisance of
its eavesdropping." 78
B. A Testimonial Privilege For Communications Arising From the
Relationship Between a Rape Victim and a Rape Crisis Counselor
The testimonial privilege extended by courts and legislatures
to the rape crisis counseling relationship protects the confidentiality
of communications arising from that relationship. 79 Professional
psychiatrists and counselors have indicated that rape has devastating
effects upon its victim. These devastating effects, they state, create
a compelling need for a confidential counseling relationship, based
on trust, to enable the victim to cope with the trauma she suffers. 8°
To C. McCortivticx, supra note 10, § 72; Louissell, supra , note 10, at 110-11; Note, supra
note 9, at 943. For a discussion of the values of privacy underlying communications privileges,
see Krattenmaker, supra note 14, at 85-94; Saltzburg, supra note 14, at 621-22.
" Louissell, supra, note 10, at 110-11.
Id. In promoting a private function base for privileges, Professor Louissell states that
strictly utilitarian bases for the privileges, such as those, emphasized by Wigmore, are icirne-
times "highly conjectural and defy scientific validation." Id. Similarly, Professor Krattenmaker
states:
IPlerhaps the majority of evidence experts share the ... perspective . that
testimonial privileges are mere bothersome exclusionalirtilei ... that impede
the accuracy of tact finding and serve no other impOrtant societal goals. Yet, at
least on an intuitive basis, other equally plausible rationales Might explain their
existence. For in the course of blocking access to the facts, priVilegek l .b provide
a barrier to officially sponsored penetration of private communicatibni.
Krattenmaker, supra note 14, at 85.
Consideration of the private function view of privileges raises the issue of whether the
individual private interests and matters of privacy and conscience, recognized and protected
by privileges, deserve constitutional status. Courts and commentators have suggested that
these individual interests fall within the constitutional right of privacy and demand consti-
tutional protection. See, e.g., In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557 (1975); Caesar v.
Mountanos 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); see also Kratten-
maker, supra note 14, at 94-98; Black ; supra note 14, at 47. Courts, however, have not yet
clearly affirmed the constitutional status of communications privileges, and therefore, one
cannot view privileges as supported by a constitutional right. See Note, supra note 9, at 944
n.40.
79 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, 20J (1986); In re Pittsburgh Action Against
Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 428 A.2d 126 (1981).
80
 HILBERMAN, supra note 3, at 41.
March 1989]	 RAPE COUNSELING PRIVILEGE	 423
Rape.traumatizes its victim to a degree beyond that experienced by
victims of, other crimes." The crime affects its victim physically,
psychologically, and emotionally. Professional psychiatrists have ad-
vanced the ; term; :`rape trauma syndrome" to encompass the wide
range of emotional and psychological reactions experienced by rape
victims. 82..17hq ; emotional and psychological reactions of a trauma-
tized .victim:range from fear, anger and depression to shame, guilt
and disgust.83 In addition to the wounds inflicted by the rape itself,
a social stigma attaches to the rape victim, causing her additional
suffering."
" In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 42-43, 428 A.2d at 140 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
82 Id at 38-39, 428 A.2d at 138 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Justice Larsen quoted Dr. George
G. Gardiner, Professor of Psychiatry at Hahneman Medical College and Hospital in Phila-
delphia, for his description of rape trauma 'syndrome contained in the Joint Brief for Amid
Curiae, Women's Law Project and Women Organized Against Rape:
The impact of rape on the victim is manifold. There is, for the victim,
threat and actuality of physical harm that may cover the spectrum from bruises
to maiming and death. In addition, there is the acute and severe loss of control
by the victim over her circumstances, Furthermore, there is intrusion into her
privacy in the most intensely personal way imaginable. As a result of the trauma
of rape there are many different emotional reactions. Commonly one will find
fear and panic based on what has actually happened or based on what might
be imagined to happen as the result of a repeated attack. In addition, the
individual may well feel shame and guilt over having been unable to prevent
or stop the attack. Anger is a very common reaction and in addition there may
be confusion. Very frequently the individual will have a period of depression,
often occurring after an apparent period of stability. The range of short term
and long lasting effects involves a number of mental disorders including, in
rare individuals, the onset of psychosis, more commonly recognized as a "ner-
vous breakdown." It is common experience that some of the more severe and
long lasting disorders will Frequently require long periods of psychiatric care
and can be manifested by significant' disability Tor the individual. A common
aspect Of rape is that the victim often feels isolated and helpless during and
immediately after the episode During this phase a frequent phenomenon
is that gUilt and shame will make it quite difficult for the individual immediately
to establish the ability to express herself completely.
id. at 39, 428 A.2d at 138 (LarSen, J., dissenting); see also BURGESS & 1-1ot.s•raom, supra note
3, at 33-47; HILBERMAN; supra note 3, at 36-39.
" In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 39, 428 A,2d at 138 (Larsen, J., dissenting); HILBERIMAN,
sup+v note 3, at 36. As Hilberman notes:
Mood swings are common [for the victim of rape) and include feelings of
humiliation, degradation, guilt, shame, embarrassment, self-blame, anger, re-
venge, and fear .... The primary defense is to block the thoughts from her
mind, although they continue m haunt her. The wish to undo the event is
reflected in fantasies of how she might have handled the situation differently,
thereby avoiding the assault.
HILBERMAN, supra note 3, at 36.
84 In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 40-43, 420 A.2d at 138-40 (Larsen, J., dissenting). "Rape
is the only crime in which the victim is doubly violated, first by the attacker and then by
424	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 30:411
The needs of rape victims are so pervasive that rape crisis
centers have emerged and developed rapidly - in an effort to help
such• victims.". Rape crisis centers are service facilities organized to
provide counseling to victims of sexual: assault. 86 The counselors
who work with the victims are referred to as rape crisis counselors
or sexual assault counselors. Rape crisis counselors are extensively
trained in-crisis counseling. 87 They provide victims with necessary
physical, psychological, 'and social support. 88 Rape crisis centers of-
fer a 'sanctuary for rape victims where they can receive the under-
standing and therapeutic counseling."
Promoters of these centers have asserted that confidentiality is
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the rape victim/
rape counselor relationship. 9° If confidentiality is, not assured, sup-
porters have stated, rape victims may•avoid obtaining the treatment
that they need, or upon entering a treatment relationship, will
refrain from revealing certain feelings and thoughts out of fear of
disclosure. 9 ' Furthermore, supporters of a privilege reason that, in .
order to receive the maximum therapeutic benefit from the rape
counseling relationship, victims must be able to trust and confide
freely in their counselor. 92 Without a guarantee of confidentiality,
the deVelopment of the necessary trust is almost impossible." Ac-
cordingly, commentators assert that confidentiality is essential to the
proper and effective therapy, treatment and counseling of a trau-
matized victim.
Courts and legislatures, recognizing the importance of the rape
crisis counseling - relationship and Its therapeutic function, have
chosen to promote the continued existence of the relationship by
granting a testimonial privilege of confidentiality to communications
society. It is the only crime in which social, 'religious, and cultural core attitudes of society
turn upon the victim. In rape, society tends to blame or accuse the women." Id. at 41 (quoting
statement of Police Superintendent Robert Colville.reprinted in Note, The Victim in a Forcible
Rape case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 335, 351 (1973)).
85 In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 58, 428 A.2d at 148 (Larsen, J., dissenting); HILBERMAN,
supra note 3, at 29-32.
86
 HILBERMAN, supra note 3, at 29.
8' In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 20, 428 A.2d at 128.
"Id,	 •
S9 HILBERMAN, supra note 3, at 31.
9  /a re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 56-57, 428 A.2d at 146-47 (Larsen, J., dissenting); see also
BURGESS & HOLSTROM, Supra note 3, at 126-127, 150-151.
91 /n re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 50, 428 A.2d at 145 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
92 In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 54, 428 A.2d at 145 (Larsen; J., dissenting).
• -9' In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 5611.2, 428 A.2d at 147 n.2 (Larsen, J., dissenting); BURGESS
& HOLSTROM, supra note 3, at 127. •
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between a rape victim and a rape crisis counselor." According to
such courts and legislatures, • the rape crisis counseling privilege
promotes and protects a socially valuable relationship that furthers
impOrtant public aims." For example, the rape counseling relation-
ship serves the public.interest of helping victims of rape cope with
the inevitable disruption of emotional stability caused by the rape. 96
Additionally, courts .have asserted that an absolute privilege of con-
fidentiality protecting this counseling relationship fosters the public
interest in the reporting of rapes and the prosecution of rapists
because the rape counseling relationship provides the victim with
the psychological and emotional support she may need .to report
the crime and to aid the police and the prosecution.° 7 Thus, society
benefits from the furtherance of this relationship. Additionally,
courts and legislatures supporting an absolute privilege for rape
counseling intend that the privilege benefit the victim. As a result
of the protection the privilege affords, the victim may obtain effec-
tive, sensitive and confidential treatment to which she. is rightfully
entitled." Moreover, once the relationship is formed, the privilege
protects the victim's privacy interests in the relationship and in the
communications arising from the relationship."
Although most states extend a testimonial privilege to com-
munications arising from the rape counseling relationship by stat-
ute,. two states have extended judicial protection to such commu-
nications in the absence of a statutory privilege.'°° For example, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the 1985 decision of In re Pittsburgh
Action Against Rape was the first court to address a claim of privilege
for communications between rape victims and rape crisis counsel-
Fo r statutorily extended privileges for rape counseling, see CAL. ENID. CODE §§ 1035-
1036 (West. Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STar..ANNT, § 52-146k (West Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch . 110, para. 8-802.1 (Smith-Hurd 1984); Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20J
(1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02( J) (West Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84(A)-22.11-
22.12 (West Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. Ht. 42, § 5945.1 (Purdun 1982); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN, § 70,125,065 (Supp. 1987). For judicially extended protection for rape counseling, see
In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. 15, 428 A,2d 126; People v. Pena, 127 Misc. 2d 1057, 487 N.Y.S.2d
935 (1985).
95 In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 24, 428 A,2d at 130; People v. Foggy, 121 111.2d 337, 348,
521 N.E.2d 86, 91.
96 In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 24, 428 A.2d at 130.
97 Id. ; Fuggy, 121 I11,2d at 348, 521 N.E.2d at 91.
9' In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 57-58, 428 A.2d at 147 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 60-62, 428 A.2d at 149-50 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
1 " See In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 28, 428 A.2d at 132; People v. Pena, 487 N.Y.S.2d 935,
939, 127 Misc. 2d 1057, 1061-62 (1985).
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ors.'°' The court in In re Pittsburgh, although refusing to extend the
Common law to create an absolute privilege of confidentiality for
the rape counseling relationship, judicially fashioned a qualified
privilege, 102
 The court held that the trial court , must permit the
defense to inspect those statements of the victim* the, file that bear
on the facts of the alleged offense, but must prohibit,the defense
from inspecting the victim's statements that do not bear on the
offense and relate only to the counseling services the rape counsel-
ing center provides.'"3 ,
In re Pittsburgh involved a contempt citation that arose in con 7
nection with a rape: ,trial : i°4 During the trial the defense counsel
requested produCtion Of the .files of the rape crisis counseling center,
Pittsburgh Action Against ,tape , (PAAR), at whiCh the victim re-
ceived counsehriV5, tii4 trial 'court ordered the director of the
center to allow the defendant to e;iainine the victim's statements in
such records for prior inconsistendf When the center's director
refused to comply, the trial court he id her in contempt.'"
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the Director
of the center argued that the court shoi.ild expand the common law
to create an absoltite priVilege of confidentiality for communications
between a rape victim and her rape crisis Counielor ; '°7
 In consid-
ering the request, the court balanced the societal intereit . Aiik6-
ifibtitig ebnifiniiiications between rape victims and rape counselors
akairiSt the societal interests both in furthering the truth-seeking
fiinctibil bf the trial system and in assuring fairness to the accused
in his effOrt td aek6h8 hithself against criminal charges.'" The court
stated that 'rake crisis centers foster such vital public interests as
helping the victims be  rape cope with the trauma and encouraging
the victims to &die forward.'" The court, however, emphasized
the opposing right of the defendant to examine prior statements of
witnesses testifying fobir the defense and the necessity of compulsory
process."° In addititiii i the court emphasized the truth-seeking
function of the adversarial system and the system's emphasis on
nu In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 19, 428 A.2d at 127.
102 Id.; see Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. 357, 360-61, 502 A.2d 148, 150 (1985).
L" In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 19, 428 A.2d at 127.
L" Id. at 21,.428 A.2d at 127-28.
105 Id. at 22, 428 A.2d at 129.
Id. at 23, 428 A.2d at 129.
1117 Id, at 24, 428 A.2d at 130.
1 " Id. at 24-27, 428 A.2d at 130-32.
M9 Id. at 24, 428 A.2d at 130.
119 Id. at 27, 428 A.2d at 132.
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disclosure as a means to truth."' The court reasoned that, because
privileges are exceptions to the "public's demand for every man's
evidence" and in derogation of the search for truth, they should
neither be lightly created nor expansively construed. "r Accordingly,
the court refused to extend the common law to create an absolute
confidentiality privilege for the rape crisis counseling relation-
ship." 3
Although the In re Pittsburgh court declined to create an abso-
lute privilege, the court did not order complete disclosure of the
file or allow the defendant unlimited access to its contents.'" In-
stead, recognizing the important functions of,rape,crisis centers and
the need to protect confidentiality :within the ,cpunseling relation-
ship, the court limited the dis,clostik'.'? i :Acordingly, the court's
resolution of the conflict attempted to harmonize the various inter-
ests involved by creating a qualified,priv,ileke allowing only limited
disclosure of relevant statements after an in camera review by the
court." 6
In the other states that extend a testimonial privilege to the
rape counselinif ,relationship,,th'e privilege is statutory."' The var-
ious.
 statutory priiilegeS differ in the degree and the extent of
confidentiality afforded 'to such communications) Some statutes
grant only a qualified ,
 privilege, which allows limited disclosure of
the confidential comintinications ,upon completion of specified re-
viewing i3i'ocedUires. arid satisfaction `of 'established criteria." 9 Be-
cause a qualified prkfile 01rOVideS access to the privileged infor-
mation,privileges generally are not the subject of
constitUtidhai attack. A number of statutes, however, afford an
absolute jzifiVilege of confidentiality to the rape crisis counseling
relationship: 'these absolute privilege statutes provide confidential-
ity for the communications arising from the counseling relationship
and afford the counselor an absolute privilege of not testifying as
1 " Id; itt 24-25, 428 A.2d at 130-31.
1 " Id. at 26-27, 428 A.2d at 131 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710
(1974)).
" 3 Id. at 27, 428 A.2d at 131.
" 4 Id. at 28, 428 A.2d at 132.
113 1d. at 28-30, 428 A.2d at 132-33.
118 1d. at 19, 428 A.2d at 127.
See supra note 6 for a list of statutory testimonial privileges for rape counseling.
1 ' 8 Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20J (West 1986) (absolute privilege) with
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1035-1036 (West Supp. 1988) (qualified privilege).
"9 See supra note 20 for an example of a statutory qualified privilege for rape counseling.
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to the contents of such communications under any circumstances.'"
An absolute privilege statute, on its face, precludes even an in camera
review.'" Because an absolute privilege statute prohibits defense
access to privileged communications under all circumstances, de-
fense counsel have often attacked absolute privileges as unconsti-
tutional on the ground that they deny the defendant his rights of
confrontation and compulsory process under the sixth amend-
ment. 122
II. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution guar-
antees certain rights to the accused in a criminal prosecution.
Among these constitutional guarantees is the mandate that "the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to. be confronted with the witnesses
against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor . ." I23
 The first clause of the sixth amendment
is termed the confrontation clause and the second clause is referred
to as the compulsory process clause. Both the confrontation clause
and the compulsory process clause accord with the truth-finding
function of our criminal justice system. The confrontation clause
assures the defendant both the right to meet witnesses against him
or her face-to-face, and the opportunity to challenge the credibility
of the witnesses and the truth of their statements. 124 Similarly, in
accord with our system's emphasis on disclosure as a means to truth,
the compulsory process clause assures to a criminal defendant a
compulsory method by which to obtain witnesses and evidence in
his or her favor.' 25
I " See supra note 21 for a list of absolute statutory privileges and for an example of a
statutory absolute privilege for rape counseling.
121 Commonwealth v. Two juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 264, 491 N.E.2d 234, 236 (1986).
121 See, e.g., In re Robert H., 199 Conn. 693, 705, 509 A.2d 475, 482 (1986); People v.
Foggy, 121 111. 2d 337, 342, 521 N.E.2d 86, 88 (1988).
Po U.S. CoNs .r. amend. VI. For a full statement of the sixth amendment, see supra note
24.
124 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 316 (1974). The Court stated that
[dross-examination is the principle means by which the believability of a witness
and the truth of his testimony are tested .... A more particular attack on the
witness's credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward
revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they
may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.
Id.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17 (1967).
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Criminal defendants in rape cases have claimed that an absolute
privilege shielding statements of a victim-complainant from their
view and from potential use as defensive evidence denies them their
rights under both the confrontation clause and the compulsory
process clause.'" Defendants have argued that, because a victim
may have made statements to a rape crisis counselor that are incon-
sistent with her testimony at trial, they must be permitted access to
such statements to use in cross-examining the victim.' 27 Because the
testimony of a victim is so essential to the prosecution's case, defen-
dants have argued, cross-examination of this witness is of compel-
ling importance to the defense.'" Because the defense may use a
victim's statements to impeach her testimony or to reveal possible
biases, prejudices or ul terior motives, defendants have argued that
they should have access to all prior statements relating to the crime
to use in their defense.' 20 Defendants have argued that the possi-
bility that they may be deprived of their liberty on the testimony of
the victim outweighs all other competing interests and justifications
in favor of the privilege.
Additionally, defendants in rape cases have maintained that an
absolute privilege violates their compulsory process rights because
it preclUdes them from calling the counselor as a witness and pro-
hibits them from introducing into evidence potentially exculpatory
evidence contained in the files of the counselor.'" Because the
communications of which the counselor has knowledge may benefit
their defense, defendants have argued that the counselor is a wit-
ness in their favor whose testimony they should obtain pursuant to
their right of compulsory process. Similarly, because the records of
the communications retained by the counselor may contain excul-
patory evidence, defendants have asserted that their right to com-
pulsory process demands that they be given access to such infor-
mation to use in their defense."'
126
 See, e.g„ In re Robert H., 199 Conn. 693, 705, 509 A.2d 475, 482 (1986); People v.
Foggy, 121 III. 2d 337, 342, 521 N.E.2d 86, 88 (1988); cf. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 998-99 (1987)
(confidentiality of child abuse records).
127
 See, e.g., Robert H., 199 Conn. at 706-07, 509 A.2d at 483; Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d at 341-
42, 521 N.E.2d at 88 (1988); cf. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 998-99 (1987) (confidentiality of child
abuse records).
12 " Robert 11., 199 Conn. at 707, 509 A.2d at 483.
12" Id, at 707, 509 A.2d at 483.
"" See, e.g., Robert H., 199 Conn. at 705, 707, 509 A.2d at 482, 483; cf. Ritchie, 107 S.
Ct. at 995.
131
 Robert H., 199 Conn. at 705, 509 A.2d at 482; cf. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 995.
430	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:411
A. The Confrontation Clause
The confrontation clause provides two types of protection for
a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify
against him or her and the right to conduct cross-examination)"
Cross-examination is an essential right of a defendant because it is
the principle means by which a defendant may test a witness's
believability and the truth of his or her testimony)" Where a de-
fendant has not received an opportunity to confront, challenge and
cross-examine persons making statements against him, the Supreme
Court has held such statements inadmissible)" Until 1974 and the
case of Davis v. Alaska, however, the Supreme Court had not ad-
dressed what constituted adequate cross-examination for the pur-
pose of satisfying the confrontation clause.
Davis v. Alaska was the first case to reach the Court involving a
direct conflict between a defendant's right of confrontation and a
state evidentiary rule of exclusion)" In Davis, the Supreme Court
held that a state evidence rule that declared the records of juvenile
offenders inadmissible denied the defendant the right of effective
cross-examination guaranteed by the confrontation clause. The
Court reasoned that the rule prohibited defense counsel from con-
ducting cross-examination directed at the juvenile witness's possible
bias)" The defendant in Davis was tried and convicted of burglary
and grand larceny)" The primary witness for the state, Richard
Greene, was a juvenile on probation, both at the time of the alleged
132
 Riichie, 107 S. Ct. at 998; Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18- 19, (1985) (per
curiam); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974).
133 Davis, 415 U.S. at 316; see also 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 51, § 1395. Professor Wigmore
states that
[tike main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent
the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands confrontation,
not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by
him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which cannot be had except by
the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers.
5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 51, § 1395.
1 " See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968) (Court prohibited introduction
of accusatory statements made at preliminary examinations unless the state makes good faith
effort to procure the attendance of the accuser at trial); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,
419 (1965) (Court forbade the reading of a pretrial confession of a separately tried accomplice
who asserted the fifth amendment privilege at the defendant's trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 407-08 (1965) (Court held that introduction of testimony given at preliminary
hearing at which defendant was not represented by counsel and did not cross-examine the
witness violated his right of confrontation).
'" See Davis, 415 U.S. at 315; Note, supra note 9, at 954.
136 Davis, 415 U.S. at 320.
137 Id. at 308.
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robbery and at the time of trial.'" Greene testified that he had seen
the defendant Davis near his house on the day of the alleged rob-
bery and identified the defendant in court.'" The police found the
stolen goods at the site at which Greene testified that he encoun-
tered the defendant.'"
The prosecution requested and received a protective order to
prevent any reference to Greene's juvenile record or probationary
status by the defense in the course of cross-examination. 14 ' The
state evidentiary rule of exclusion at issue forbade the disclosure of
juvenile records in judicial proceedings. 142 Defense counsel sought
to introduce Greene's juvenile record and his probationary status
during cross-examination in order to probe Greene for bias and
prejudice.' 43 Defense counsel wished to argue that Greene acted
hastily in identifying the defendant because he feared prosecution
himself and was concerned over possible jeopardy to his probation
if he did not cooperate with the prosecution.'" Because the trial
court refused to lift its protectiVe order, the defense counsel cross-
examined Greene, but could not refer to his juvenile record and
probation.' 45 The defendant Davis was ultimately convicted, and
the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. 14 "
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to the
question of whether the state's evidentiary exclusionary rule denied
1 " Id. at 311.
139 Id. at 309-10.
No Id. at 309.
141 Id. at 310-11.
"7 Id. at 311 n. 1. Alaska Rule of Children's Procedure 23 provides: "No adjudication,
order, or disposition of a juvenile case shall be admissible in a court not acting in the exercise
of juvenile jurisdiction except for use in a presentencing procedure in a criminal case where
the superior court, in its discretion, determines that such use is appropriate." The Alaska
statute provides: "The commitment and placement of a child and evidence given in the court
are not admissible as evidence against the Minor in a subsequent case or proceedings in any
other court .. .." ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) (1971).
"3 Davis, 415 U.S. at 311.
144 id .
1 " Id, at 313. The Court specifically referred to the trial record and certain answers of
the witness Greene to ilitiStraite the tension between the right of confrontation and the state's
policy of protecting a witness with a juvenile record. The Court noted that, because "defense
counsel was prohibited froth Making inquiry as to the witness's being on probation[,]
Greene's protestations Of Unconcern over possible police suspicion and his categorical
denial of ever having been the subject of any similar law enforcement questioning went
unchallenged." Id, at 313-14. The Court further recognized that the truth of this negative
answer is questionable when one knows of his juvenile record and thus "Wt. would be difficult
to conceive of a situation more clearly illustrating the need for cross-examination." M. at
314.
'''n Id. at 314.
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the defendant his confrontation clause right to cross-examine
Greene adequately. 1 k7 The Supreme Court reversed the Alaska Su-
preme Court' and held that this restriction on the scope of cross-
examination questioning denied the defendant his right of effective
cross-examination in violation of the confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment.'" Although the Alaska court permitted the de-
fense counsel to confront and cross-examine Greene at trial, the
Supreme Court determined that this cross-examination was inade-
quate and that the defendant's rights under the confrontation clause
required. more. 149 The Court stated that the confrontation clause
guarantees a criminal defendant not merely a right of cross-exam-
ination, but a right of effective cross-examination.m According to
the Davis Court, the prohibition against any reference to the wit-
ness's juvenile records and probationary status precluded the de-
fense counsel from cross-examining the witness concerning any
potential bias arising from his probationary status.''' Although the
defense counsel was able to ask Greene if he was biased, the Court
reasoned, he could not expose crucial .facts from which he could
argue that Greene .was biased or from which the jury could appro-
priately draw negative inferences as to Greene's credibility.' 52 If the
defense counsel had been perinitted to pursue this line of inquiry,
the Court noted, • the defense counsel may have caused serious
damage to the state's case: 53 The Court ruled that this restriction
on the actual questioning during cross-examination violated the
defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses.' 54
The Court recognized the state's policy interest in protecting
the confidentiality of juvenile offenders, but concluded that the
defendant's right to cross-examine an adverse witness effectively for
bias was paramount to the state's policy."5 The Court reasoned that
the defendant's constitutional right and interest in the cross-exam-
ination of a crucial identification witness outweighed the temporary
embarrassment and blemish to reputation that Greene might suffer
from disclosure of his juvenile record.' 56 Consequently, the Su-
147 1d. at 315.
i" Id. at 318.
1 49 Id.
Bo Id.
1 " Id. at 319.
'" Id. at 318,
'"Id. at 319.
'" Id. at 318. '
Id. at 319.
' 56 Id.
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preme Court ruled that the Alaska court's prohibition against ref-
erence to the witness's juvenile record and probationary status de-
nied the defendant the right of effective cross-examination.' 57
The Supreme Court again addressed the scope of a criminal
defendant's right of effective cross-examination under the sixth
amendment in the 1987 case of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie.' 58 Ritchie
involved a conflict between a defendant's rights under the confron-
tation clause of the sixth amendment and a state statute declaring
confidential the files of a state service agency charged with investi-
gating child abuse.'" A plurality of the Supreme Court held that
denying the defendant access to the agency's files under the statute
did not violate the defendant's right to effective cross-examination
under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.' 6°
In Ritchie, the defendant was charged with rape, involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse, incest and corruption of a minor. The
victim, his thirteen-year-old daughter, claimed that her father had
• 157 1d. at 320. -
15N 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987). 	 •
159 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 994. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie also involved a compulsory process
claim. Sec infra notes 249-75 and accompanying text for discussion of Ritchie's holding
regarding the compulsory process clause,
16* 107 S. Ct.. at 1000. In Ritchie, the Supreme Court addressed claims by the defendant
under both the confrontation and the compulsory process clauses. Id. at 998, 1000. A majority
or the Court considered the defendant's claim regarding the compulsory process clause
under a due process analysis established by the Courts related fourteenth amendment prec-
edents. Id. at 1001. Although the Court considered the claim under a due process analysis,
the Court stated that the compulsory process clause- granted no greater protection in this
area than the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. A majority of the Court
held that the defendant's rights to due process required that the trial court conduct an in
camera review for material evidence. Id. at 1002. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brermari,
Marshall and Scalia, dissented from the Court's judgment on grounds of limited jurisdiction,
not on grounds based on due process, compulsory process or confrontation. Id, at 1009-13.
Several of the Justices, however, disagreed as to the scope of the right of effective cross-
examination guaranteed by the confrontation clause. Id. at 994. A plurality of the Court,
comprised of Justices Powell, Rehnquist, White and O'Connor, limited the right of cross-
examination to a trial right unconstitutionally restricted only by limitations on questioning
at trial. Id. at 1000. Justice Blackmun issued a concurring opinion in which he disagreed with
the plurality and stated that denial of pretrial access to material information might infringe
upon the right of effective cross-examination. hi. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun, however, concurred in the Court's judgment because he believed that the Court's
in camera review procedure under the due process analysis solved any confrontation clause
problem. hi. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
dissented and stated • that denying the defendant access to information, including prior
statements of the witness that might form the basis of cross-examination, violated the defen-
dant's right of confrontation. Id. (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice
Brennan disagreed with Justice Blackmun, arguing that an in camera materiality inquiry did
not solve the confrontation clause violation. Id. at 1009 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., dissenting).
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assaulted her approximately twice a week for the past four years. 161
After the child reported the incidents to the police, the police
referred the matter to Children and Youth Services (CYS), a pro-
tective service agency established by the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania and charged with investigating cases of suspected child
abuse, neglect and mistreatment. 162
The statute at issue in Ritchie provided that all reports and
other information CYS obtained in the course of an investigation
must remain confidential, subject to certain enumerated excep-
tions.'" During trial the defendant served CYS with a subpoena
seeking access to the records concerning his daughter; CYS refused
to comply, claiming that the confidentiality statute protected the
records from disclosure.'" Relying on the statute, the trial court
refused to order disclosure and the jury convicted the defendant
on all counts.'" The defendant claimed that failure to disclose the
contents of the CYS file violated the confrontation clause and the
compulsory process clause because the file might contain exculpa-
tory evidence and the victim's inconsistent statements.' 66 The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the trial court and ruled that
the statute violated the confrontation clause of the United States
Constitution. ' 67
'B' Id. at 994.
152
165 1d. at 999 n.2. The statute provides in relevant part:
• (a) Except as provided in section 14 [PA. STAT. ANN., tit. I I, § 2214 (Purdon
Supp. 1986)], reports made pursuant to this act including but not limited to
report summaries of child abuse • • and written reports ... as well as any other
information obtained, reports written or photographs or x-rays taken concern-
ing alleged instances of child abuse in the possession of the department, a
county children and youth social services agency or a child protective services
shall be confidential and shall only be made available to: ... (5) A court of
competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order.
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 11, § 2215(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986). The Court noted that at the time of
trial the statute only provided five exceptions, including an exception for court-ordered
disclosure. In 1982, however, the Court observed, the statute was amended to increase the
number of exceptions. Id.
164 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 994.
165 Id, at 995.
Id. at 995, 1000.
167 Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. 357, 367-68, 502 A.2d 148, 153 (1985). The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not agree with the lower appellate court that the search
for material evidence must be conducted in camera by the trial judge and limited to only
verbatim statements. Id. at 360-61, 502 A.2d at 150. Rather, the court concluded that the
defendant was entitled to review the entire file to search for any useful evidence. Id. at 367-
68, 502 A.2d at 153. The court ruled that non-disclosure violated both the confrontation
and the compulsory process clause. Id. at 367, 502 A.2d at 153. The constitutional infirmity,
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The. United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-
sider whether and to what extent a state's interest in the confiden-
tiality of its investigative files concerning child abuse must yield to
a criminal defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights.' 68
A plurality of the Supreme Court held that failure to disclose the
CYS files because of the ,statute's prohibition did not violate the
defendant's rights under the confrontation clause.' 69 The plurality
ruled that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court mistakenly relied on a
broad interpretation of Davis v. Alaska.'70 The four Justices expressly
rejected interpreting Davis to mean that a statutory privilege cannot
stand when a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for protected
information that might be used at trial to impeach or otherwise
undermine a witness's testimony.'" The plurality rejected such an
interpretation as contrary to its decisions regarding the confronta-
tion clause.' 72 The plurality reasoned that prior cases limited the
confrontation clause to a right to cross-examine at trial.' 73 The four
Justices rejected the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's broader inter-
pretation because they determined that such a broad interpretation
would transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally
compelled right of pretrial discovery.' 74
The plurality specified that' the right of confrontation is a trial
right designed to prevent improper restrictions on questioning dur-
ing cross-examination. This right to question without limitation, the
Justices stressed, does not include the power to require the pretrial
disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in con-
the court reasoned, was that the defendant! was denied the opportunity to have the, records
reviewed by "the eyes and the perspective of an advocate," who may see relevance in facts
that a neutral judge would not. Id.
L"" Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 994. The defendant argued that denying him access to the files
interfered with his right of cross-examination under the confrontation clause because he
could not effectively question his daughter without the CYS material. Id. at 998. Had the
files been disclosed, the defendant claimed, he might have been able to show that the daughter
made statements to the CYS counselor that were inconsistent with her trial statements, or
perhaps to reveal that his daughter acted with an improper motive. Id. at 998-99.
16 ' 1 Id. at 1000.
" I 'M. at 999. For a discussion Of Davis v. Alaska see supra notes 135-57 and accom-
panying text.
DI Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999.
' 72 Id.
1 " Id. (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) ("[1]t is this literal right to
'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the
confrontation clause.") and Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) ("The right to Confron-
tation is basically a trial right.")).
1 ^ 4 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999.
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tradicting unfavorable testimony.' 75 As the Justices indicated, the
confrontation clause does not guarantee a defendant cross-exami-
nation that is effective in whatever manner a defendant wishes, but
only guarantees that a defendant receive an opportunity for effec-
tive cross-examination. 176 The plurality noted that the Supreme
Court has only held that a specific statutory or court-imposed re-
straint at trial on the scope of questioning violated the confrontation
clause.'" Accordingly, the plurality restated the requirement that
only restrictions during trial that inhibit the scope of cross-exami-
nation violate the right of confrontation.' 78
The plurality relied upon the Davis decision to support its view
that only restrictions on the scope of questioning at trial constituted
violations of confrontation rights.' 79 In Davis, the Ritchie plurality
noted, the state court had prohibited defense counsel from ques-
tioning the witness at trial about his juvenile record, even though
that evidence might have affected the witness's credibility.'" Ac-
cording to the four Justices, the constitutional problem in Davis was
restriction , on the scope of his cross-examination questioning, not
the denial of access to the information. 18 '
Thus, the plurality concluded that the trial court's refusal to
disclose the CYS file to the defendant in Ritchie did not violate the
defendant's rights under the confrontation clause because such a
denial did not constitute a restriction on the scope of questioning
at trial. In ruling that withholding the CYS file did not violate the
confrontation clause, the plurality reasoned that a violation would
have occurred only if the judge prevented defense counsel from
cross-examining the daughter. Because the defense counsel was able
to cross-examine all the witnesses fully, the plurality found no vio-
lation of the defendant's right to cross-examination guaranteed by
the confrontation clause.' 82
Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion 183 and Justice Bren-
nan in his dissenting opinion' 84 disagreed with the plurality's narrow
interpretation that the confrontation clause applied only to restric-
"5 Id.
17 " Id. (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1985)).
177 Id. at 1000.
178 Id,
179 Id. at 999.
is° Id.
is' Id. at 1000.
' 82 Id.
I" Id. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
184 Id. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tions on cross-examination imposed at trial. In his concurring opin-
ion, Justice Blackmun rejected the plurality's conclusion that the
confrontation clause has no relevance to pretrial discovery.' 85 In-
stead, Justice Blackmun expressed the view that denying a defen-
dant pretrial access to information that might increase the effec-
tiveness of cross-examination of a crucial prosecution witness may
violate a defendant's right to confrontation.' 86 Unlike the plurality,
Justice Blackmun supported an inquiry into the actual effectiveness
of the cross-examination. Divorcing confrontation analysis from an
inquiry into the actual effectiveness of cross-examination, Justice
Blackmun stated, may transform the right of confrontation into an
empty formality.'"'
As justice Blackmun indicated, in some cases simple cross-
examination questioning at trial will satisfy a defendant's right of
effective cross-examination.1 88 Justice Blackmun noted, however,
that in other circumstances, such as the situation in Davis, simple
questioning of the witness at trial does not allow a defendant an
effective cross-examination. 189 Consequently, instead of limiting the
right of confrontation to a trial right, Justice Blackmun stated that
the confrontation clause requires examination of the effectiveness
of the cross-examination actually permitted.' 9° Thus, Justice Black-
mun indicated that depriving the defendant in Ritchie of the ma-
terial in the CYS files may very well have inhibited his cross -exam-
ination and rendered it ineffective.' 91 Justice Blackmun, however,
still concurred in the Court's judgment, ruling that the Court's in
camera procedure, which the court developed to satisfy the defen-
dant's compulsory process rights, adequately resolved any confron-
tation problem. 192 , •
The dissent in Ritchie also 'challenged the plurality's narrow
reading of the confrontation clause and argued that depriving a
defendant of access to the victim's pretrial statements violated the
defendant's right of cross-examination under the confrontation
1"6




	 at 1004-1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
LB9 Id. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
""'Id. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
L91 a
192 Id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J„ concurring). See infra notes 232-43 for a discussion of this
in camera procedure that the Rilchie Court authorized to satisfy the defendant's rights to due
process and compulsory process, notwithstanding its decision under the confrontation clause.
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clause.'" The dissent agreed with the plurality that restrictions on
cross-examination questioning at trial constituted a violation of the
confrontation clause.'" The dissent disagreed, however, that the
confrontation clause prohibits only such at-trial restrictions. Rather,
the Ritchie dissent stated that defendants may also be deprived of
their rights of effective cross-examination where they are denied
access to or use of information that might serve as the basis for
cross-examination. 19"
The Ritchie dissent also rejected the plurality's suggestion that
the lower court mistakenly relied on Davis v. Alaska in holding that
denying the defendant access to the CYS's files violated his rights
under the confrontation clause.' 96
 The dissent indicated that noth-
ing in the Davis opinion established that only at-trial restrictions on
the scope of cross-examination could violate the confrontation
clause.'97
 Rather, the dissent noted, the prohibition on disclosure of
the juvenile records constituted the underlying problem in Davis.'"
Accordingly, the Ritchie dissent argued that denying the defendant
access to his daughter's prior statements contained in the CYS files
violated his right to cross-examination guaranteed by the confron-
tation clause.' 99
Furthermore, unlike the concurring Justice, the dissent did not
agree that the majority's in camera review procedure and materiality
inquiry adequately addressed the confrontation clause violation. 200
Under the majority's materiality inquiry, the dissent noted, evidence
is material only if it will probably affect the outcome of tria1. 20 '
Because the utility of prior statements lies in their potential for
undermining a witness's credibility, such statements on their face
may not appear to be "material."202
 Additionally, the Ritchie dissent
indicated that the defense counsel, not the trial judge, should con-
duct the evaluation of the CYS files because only the defense counsel
1 " Ritchie, 107 S. Ct, at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125 1d.
196 Id. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 9' Id.
19-" Id. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 99 M.
200 Id. See infra notes 232-43 for a discussion of this in camera procedure that the Court
developed to satisfy the defendant's rights under the due process clause.
20 ' Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
sus Id.
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can adequately identify information that may be used effectively
during cross-examination, 2"
In summary, the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to cross-examine wit-
nesses against him or her, In Davis v. Alaska, the first Supreme
Court decision involving a conflict between a defendant's right of
confrontation and a state rule of evidence, the Court held that the
state rule declaring the records of juvenile offenders inadmissible
violated the defendant's right to cross-examination. The Davis Court
emphasized that a defendant possesses a right to "effective" cross-
examination. The Davis decision, particularly the meaning of "ef-
fective" cross-examination, is subject to different interpretations. In
the 1987 Supreme Court case of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the Court
divided over the correct interpretation of Davis and the proper
scope of the right of effective cross-examination. In Ritchie, a plu-
rality of the Court held that failure to disclose the CYS agency's
files, which the statute protected as confidential, did not infringe
upon the defendant's right of cross-examination. Pursuant to the
plurality opinion, which is presently the law, the right of effective
cross-examination simply requires that the defendant receive the
opportunity to question an adverse witness at trial without restric-
tion. The plurality rejected the opinions of the dissent and the
concurrence which maintained that the right of effective cross-
examination included the right to obtain pretrial access to infor-
mation that might possibly increase the effectiveness of cross-ex-
amination. Thus, under the present state of the law, as established
by the Ritchie plurality opinion, only restrictions on the scope of
cross-examination questioning at trial violate a defendant's right of
effective cross-examination.
B. The Compulsory Process Clause
The compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment guar-
antees to a criminal defendant the right "to have compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor . .." 2"4 Until recently, the
Supreme Court rarely addressed a criminal defendant's rights un-
der the compulsory process clause, 2"5 The Supreme Court decisions
VI Id,
2" U.S. CONST. amend, VI.
2D 3 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1000. The first analysis of the compulsory process clause occurred
during the treason trial of Aaron Burr in 1807. Id, Chief Justice Marshall ruled that because
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in which the Court did address a criminal defendant's rights under
the compulsory process clause establish that defendants 'have the
right to the government's assistance in compelling the attendance
of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury
exculpatory evidence. 2"
• The Supreme Court's 1967 decision of Washington v. Texas in-
volved a direct conflict between a defendant's rights to compulsory
process and a state rule of evidence. 207 The Washington Court held
that two Texas statutes, which prohibited persons charged or con-
victed as coparticipants of the same crime from testifying for one
another, unconstitutionally deprived the defendant of his right to
have compulsory. process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. 208
 In
Washington, the defendant was convicted of murder with malice and
sentenced to fifty years in prison. 209
 At trial, the defendant Wash-
ington testified. in his own behalf that his coparticipant, Fuller,
drunk at the time, had shot the decedent and that he, the defendant,
had run before the shots were fired."° In support of his testimony
and defense, the defendant offered the testimony of Fuller, The
Court indicated that, according to the trial record, Fuller would
have testified that the defendant pulled at him, attempted to per-
suade him to leave and ran before Fuller fired the fatal shot. 2 " As
the Court noted, because Fuller was the only other person who
knew who fired the gun, his testimony .was undisputably relevant,
material and vital to the defense. 212
 The two Texas statutes, how-
ever, prohibited Fuller, a coparticipant previously convicted of the
of Burr's compulsory process rights, the Court must permit Burr to serve a subpoena on
President Jefferson, requesting the production of allegedly incriminating evidence. Id. For
the next 160 years, however, the Supreme Court rarely considered the compulsory process
clause. The pre-1967 cases that mention compulsory process do nut provide an extensive
analysis of the clause. See, e.g., United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex
parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782, 784 (1887). Yet, in 1967 the Court began articulating some of
the specific rights secured by this sixth amendment clause. See Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14 (1967).
25 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1001; see, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973);
Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972) (per curiam); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 18-19 (1967); cf. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972) (per curiam) (decision based on
due process clause).
7°7
 388 U.S. at 14-15. The two Texas statutes at issue in Washington prohibited persons
charged or convicted as coparticipants of the same crime from testifying for one another. Id.
at 16 n.4.
766 1d. at 16.
2Ir ' Id. at 15.
2 "' Id. at 16.
2i I H .
	•
2'21d.
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same crime, from testifying in the defendant's behalf. In light of
these statutes the trial judge had refused to allow Fuller to testify. 2 ' 3
The jury convicted the defendant, and the Texas Court of Appeals
upheld the conviction:214
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed. 2 ' 5 Rejecting
the state's justification that accomplices are unreliable witnesses be-
cause they are likely to be prejudiced in favor of the defense, the
Supreme Court held that the statutes violated the defendant's com-
pulsory process rights. 216 The Court reasoned that the statutes un-
constitutionally denied the defendant his right to compulsory pro-
cess because the state arbitrarily denied the defendant the right to
put on the stand an available witness whose testimony was relevant
and material to the defense:2 ' 7 Although the Court disapproved of
the statutes at issue in Washington and their infringement on the
defendant's right of compulsory process, the Court expressly stated
that its opinion did not disapprove of testimonial privileges that are
supported by entirely different policy considerations than the reli-
ability and bias concerns that support disqualifications for inter-
est. 218
in the 1973 decision of Chambers v. Mississippi the Supreme
Court again restricted the operation of state rules of evidence where
their effect denied a defendant his right of confrontation and his
right to a fair trial:219 In Chambers the defendant, charged with
murder, attempted to introduce into evidence out-of-court state-
ments that another man, McDonald, had confessed to the crime. 220
State hearsay rules, however, prevented the admission of such state-
ments.22 ' Additionally, a state "voucher rule," a variant of the old
common law rule that parties vouch for the credibility of their own
", Id. at 17.
2/4 Id.
" Id.
2 '" Id. at 22-23.
2 '/ M. at 23. The Supreme Court noted the essential importance of the compulsory
process clause to a defense:
The rights to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance,
if necessary, in plain terms is the right to present a defense, the right to present
the defendant's version of the acts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it
may decide where the truth lies,
Id. at 19.
218 1d. at 23 n.21.
2 ' 9 410 U.S. 284,298 (1973).
mid. at 293-94.
sit Id.
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witnesses, prevented the defendant from calling McDonald as a
witness and impeaching him directly with the confessions. 222
The Court ruled that the state voucher rule denied the defen-
dant his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against
hirn.223 Yet, because Chambers claimed a denial of due process, the
Court did not reverse based on this error alone. Instead, the Court
stated that the question of whether a violation of due process oc-
curred depended upon the ultimate impact of both the confronta-
tion clause violation and the trial court's refusal to allow Chambers
to call other witness. 224 Thus, the Court applied a general due
process analysis in assessing whether the defendant ultimately re-
ceived a fair trial. 225 The Court held that prohibiting Chambers
from calling other witnesses and from cross-examining McDonald,
when viewed together, denied Chambers a trial in accord with tra-
ditional and fundamental standards of due process. 226
In the case of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the Supreme Court con-
fronted the claim that a statute disallowing the defendant access to
the files of a state investigative agency regarding child abuse violated
his rights to compulsory process, as well as his rights of confronta-
tion. 227
 Upon considering the defendant's compulsory process
claim, a majority of the Court decided that its fourteenth amend-
ment precedents228 addressing the fundamental fairness of trials
established a clear framework for review of the compulsory process
claim.229
 Thus, the Ritchie Court adopted a due process analysis.28°
Applying a due process analysis, the Court held that the defendant's
right to discover exculpatory evidence under the fourteenth amend-
222 Id. at 295-96.
222 Id. at 297-98.
224 Id. at 298.
229 Id. at 298-302. The Court quoted Justice Black, writing for the Court in In Re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948), to identify the minimum essentials of a fair trial: A person's right
to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense—
a right to his day in court—are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include,
at a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be
represented by counsel.
Id. at 294.
226 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
227 107 S. Ct. 989, 995 (1987). Although the defendant did not assert a compulsory
process claim, the Court addressed the defendant's 'rights under the compulsory process
clause. Id.
226 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976): Wardius y. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
229 Riiehie, 107 S. Ct. at 1001.
2" Id.
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ment's due process clause requires that the court conduct an in
camera review of the CYS file to determine whether it contained
material information that probably would have changed the out-
come of trial. 231
The Ritchie Court determined that it should consider the de-
fendant's claimed right to discover favorable evidence by reference
to clue process because the applicability of the compulsory process
clause of the sixth amendment to this type of case was unsettled. 232
The Court considered the sparse history of its cases addressing the
compulsory process clause and indicated that its cases established,
at a minimum, that defendants ,have the right to the government's
assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at
trial and the right to put exculpatory evidence before a jury. 233 The
Ritchie Court noted, however, that the Court has never squarely
held that a defendant's compulsory process rights include the right
to discover the identity of witnesses or to require the government
to produce exculpatory evidence. Rather, the Ritchie Court noted
that the Court has addressed such claims under the broader pro-
tection of fourteenth amendment precedents. 234 Consequently, the
Ritchie Court chose to apply a due process analysis to the defendant's
claims in Ritchie . 235
Applying a due process analysis, the Ritchie. Court looked to
precedents establishing that the government has the obligation to
turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the
accused and material to guilt or punishment. 23" The Court stated
that evidence qualifies as "material" if a reasonable probability exists
that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the
defense possessed the evidence.237 A reasonable probability, the
Court stated, is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome." 235 Pursuant to this constitutional principle, the
Court ruled that the defendant in Ritchie was entitled to have the
trial court review the CYS file to determine •whether it contained
material information. 239
Id. at 1002-03.
"' Id. at 1001.
233
 Id. at 1000-01.
234 Id, at 100 t .
235 Id.
23 ' 1 Id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963) and United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97,107-114 (1976)).
237 Id.
238 Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682).
299 Id. at 1002.
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The Ritchie Court, however, rejected the lower court's holding
that the defendant had the right to have his attorney review the
entire CYS file.240 As the Supreme Court noted, the lower court
held that a defendant has the right to have his attorney view the
file because a defense attorney might recognize useful evidence
where a neutral judge would not. 24 ' Stressing that the right to
discover exculpatory evidence does not include the authority to
rummage through the Commonwealth's files, and recognizing the
adverse effects full disclosure would have on the state's efforts to
uncover and treat abuse, the Court ruled that only the court in
camera should review the files for material exculpatory evidence. 242
According to the Court, an in camera review served the defendant's
interests without destroying the state's need to protect the confi-
dentiality of communications between those involved in child abuse
investigations. 243
The Ritchie Court rejected the state's argument against any
disclosure, even an in camera review. The state argued against a
materiality inquiry because the contents of the file are privileged
under •the statute and because disclosure would defeat the state's
compelling interest in confidentiality on the defense counsel's mere
speculation that the file might contain exculpatory evidence. 244 The
Ritchie Court rejected this argument, ruling that the public interest,
although strong, did not prevent disclosure in all circumstances. 245
The statute, the Court indicated, provided for disclosure in certain
instances, including when a court order directs the CYS to reveal
its files.246 Thus, the Court distinguished the statute at issue from a
statute that grants the absolute authority to shield its files. 247 As an
example of such an absolute statute, the Court cited the Pennsyl-
vania unqualified statutory privilege for communications between
sexual assault victims and counselors. 248 Consequently, the Court
ruled that, because the Pennsylvania legislature contemplated some
use of the CYS records in judicial proceedings, the statute did not
2" Id. at 1003.
211 Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. 357, 367, 502 A.2d 148, 153 (1985).
242 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1003.
2" Id. at 1004.






The Court stated: "[wle express no opinion on whether the result in this case
would have been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from disclosure to
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel." Id. at 1002 n.14.
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prevent all disclosure in criminal trials. 24° Therefore, in the absence
of any apparent state policy against some disclosure, the Court
found no reason to bar disclosure after a court determined that the
information was material to the defense of the accused."° Accord-
ingly, the Court held that on remand the trial court should conduct
an in camera review and grant the defendant a new trial if it found
material evidence. 25 '
In summary, the compulsory process clause of the sixth amend-
ment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to the government's
assistance in obtaining witnesses in his favor and the right to place
exculpatory evidence before the jury. In the Supreme Court deci-
sion of Washington v. Texas, the Court held that two state statutes
that prohibited coparticipants of the same crime from testifying for
one another unconstitutionally infringed upon a defendant's right
to compulsory process. The Washington Court reasoned that the
state interests supporting the rules excluding coparticipant testi-
mony were not compelling enough to justify denial of the defen-
dant's compulsory process rights. In the 1973 decision of Chambers
v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court chose to address a potential com-
pulsory process violation, in addition to a possible confrontation
clause problem, under a due process analysis. Thus, the Court
inquired whether the state hearsay rules and the state voucher rule,
which prohibited the defendant from both introducing exculpatory
evidence and calling witnesses in his favor, denied the defendant
the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. After balancing the competing interests,
the Court held that the combined effect of these rules violated the
defendant's right to a fair trial.
The Supreme Court decision of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie is the
most recent Supreme Court case involving a defendant's rights
under the compulsory process clause. In Ritchie, the defendant
claimed that a statute declaring confidential a child abuse investi-
gatory agency's files violated his rights to compulsory process be-
cause it prohibited him from placing before the jury exculpatory
evidence potentially contained in the files. Because the case involved
a state agency, the Court determined that its fourteenth amendment
precedents, establishing that the government possesses the obliga-
tion to reveal evidence in its possession that is favorable to the
242 Id. at 1002.
25° Id.
951 Id,
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accused and material to guilt or innocence, provided the appropri-
ate framework for review. Applying such a due process analysis
under those precedents, the Court held that the trial court should
conduct an in camera review to determine whether the files con-
tained material evidence. Although the Court did not address the
application of the compulsory process guarantees to the Ritchie
defendant's claims, the Court did state that the compulsory process
clause provides no greater protections in this area than those pro-
vided by due process. Thus, at a minimum, Ritchie establishes that
an in camera review satisfies the guarantees of the compulsory pro-
cess clause.
III. STATE COURTS CONFRONT CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
ABSOLUTE STATUTORY PRIVILEGES FOR THE RAPE CRISIS
COUNSELING RELATIONSHIP
Courts in several states have addressed the conflict between a
rape defendant's sixth amendment rights and an absolute confiden-
tiality privilege for the rape crisis counseling relationship. 252 In
deciding the constitutionality of these absolute statutes, the courts
have provided a variety of solutions to resolve the conflict. Most
courts have ruled that an absolute privilege unconstitutionally in-
fringes upon a defendant's sixth amendment rights. 253 These courts
have fashioned various qualified privileges to accommodate a de-
fendant's rights and to continue to maintain some protection for
communications arising from the rape counseling relationship. 254
In contrast to these courts, one court has determined that an ab-
solute privilege statute withstands constitutional attack. 255 Thus,
whether a statute granting an absolute privilege to the rape crisis
counseling relationship is constitutional is an unsettled issue.
552 See In re Robert H., 199 Conn. 693, 706-07, 509 A.2d 475, 483 (1986); People v.
Foggy, 121 IR. 2d 337, 342, 521 N.E.2d 86, 88 (1988); Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397
Mass. 261, 263, 491 N.E.2d 234, 236 (1986); Commonwealth v. Samuels, 354 Pa. Super. 128,
134, 511 A.2d 221, 224 (1986); Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 469 A.2d
1161, 1163 (R.I. 1983).
25.'
	 Robert H., 199 Conn. at 706-09, 509 A.2d at 483-84; Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. at
266, 491 N.E.2d at 238; Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d at 1166.
254 See, e.g., Robert H., 199 Conn. at 708-09, 509 A.2d at 484 (fashioned qualified privilege'
allowing detailed in camera review); Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d at 1163, 1166 (recommended
statutory proposal B embodying qualified privilege providing for an in camera review). See
infra note 271 and note 284.
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Several courts have held that an absolute privilege for com-
munications between a rape victim and a rape crisis counselor may
deprive a defendant of his constitutional rights under the confron-
tation and compulsory process clauses or the sixth amendment. 2'"
Both the Connecticut Supreme Court in the 1986 case of In re Robert
H. and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in a 1983 Advisory Opinion
to the House of Representatives ruled an absolute statutory privilege
for rape crisis counseling unconstitutional. 257
 These courts relied
on the United States Supreme Court decision of Davis v. Ataska258
to hold that the absolute privilege infringed on the defendant's
right of confrontation. 259 These two courts ruled that such an ab-
solute denial of access to potential exculpatory or impeaching evi-
dence could not withstand constitutional attack. 2 ° Consequently,
they chose to fashion a qualified privilege allowing disclosure to
accommodate the defendant's rights. 2"
In Robert H. the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the
absolute privilege embodied in the statute violated the defendants'
constitutional rights to confront the victim-witness and cross-ex-
amine her about material in her rape counseling records. 2"2 Robert
H. involved the alleged rape of a fourteen-year-old victim, "T," by
three juveniles, Robert, Richard and Blair. 2"' At trial, the defen-
dants subpoenaed the files of the Woman's Center of Greater Dan-
bury. 2" The Center filed a motion to quash the subpoena, claiming
a testimonial privilege under the statute. 2"5 The defendant argued
25" See Robert H„ 199 Conn. at 706-09, 509 A.2d at. 483-84 (addresses only violation of
the confrontation clause); Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. at '266-67, 491 N.E.2d at 238 (mentions
the defendant's rights under both the confrontation and compulsory process clauses, but
does not discuss violation of each clause separately); Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d at 1166
(addresses violation of both the confrontation and compulsory process clauses). Although
the defendants in each of these cases alleged a violation of their rights to due process under
the fourteenth amendment, not one of these courts addressed the due process claim or
applied a due process analysis.
257
 Robert H., 199 Conn. at 706-09, 509 A.2d at 483-84; Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d at
1166.
258 415 U.S. 308 (1974). See supra notes 135-57 and accompanying text.
258 Robert H., 199 Corm. at 707-08, 509 A.2d at 483-84; Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d at
1165.
20" Robert H., 199 Conn. at 706-09, 509 A.2d at 483-84; Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d at
1166.
2" I Robert H., 199 Conn. at 708-09, 509 A.2d at 484; Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d at 1166.
See infra note 271 and note 284 and accompanying text,
202 Robert H., 199 Conn. at 706-09, 509 A.2d at 483-84,
266
	 at 695-96, 509 A,2d at 477-78.
2N-1 The Women's Center of Greater Danbury is a rape crisis center,
2" 5
 Robed H., 199 Conn. at 698, 509 A.2d at 479. The Connecticut statute at issue provides
in relevant part:
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that the absolute rape counseling privilege embodied in the Con-
necticut statute violated the federal and state constitutions. 266 With-
out considering the constitutional claim, the trial court ruled that
the records fell within the statutory privilege and quashed the de-
fendants' subpoena.267
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the defen-
dants argued that the court's denial of access to the records of the
rape crisis center deprived them of their constitutional rights of
confrontation, compulsory process and due process. 268 The defen-
dants argued that, because the outcome of the case turned upon
the credibility of the victim-witness, the records were clearly relevant
and.material. 269 The Connecticut Supreme Court agreed with the
defendants and held that the statute's absolute privilege violated
the defendants' confrontation rights. 2" Despite the constitutional
violation, the court did not completely override the privilege and
allow full disclosure. Rather, the Robert H. court fashioned a pro-
cedure to resolve the conflict between the competing interests. 27 '
(b) A battered woman's counselor or a sexual assault counselor shall not
disclose any confidential communications made to such counselor by a victim in
any civil or criminal case or proceeding ... unless the victim making the con-
fidential communications waives the privilege ....
(e) The privilege established by this section shall not apply 	 (3) where
... the counselor has knowledge that the victim has given perjured testimony
and the defendant or the state has made an offer of proof that perjury may
have been committed.
Id. at 698-99 11.5, 509 A.2d at 479 n.5 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146k).
2" Robert H., 199 Conn. at 699-700, 509 A.2d at 480.
2" Id. at 701, 509 A.2d at 480.
20" Id. at 705, 509 A.2d at 482.
269 Id. at 705, 509 A.2d at 482. The defendants argued that
because the court chose to disbelieve the victim's testimony as to her unwilling-
ness to engage in the first instance of vaginal penetration and yet chose to
believe her testimony as to the circumstances surrounding the second instance
of vaginal penetration involving the broomstick, it demonstrates how 'central
and crucial the credibility issue was to the adjudication.'
Id. at 707, 509 A.2d at 483. The Robert H. court recognized that the victim's credibility was
important because the victim's testimony was crucial to the state's case. Id. As in many sexual
assault cases, the court noted, the victim is the only witness to the crime. Id. The victim's
statements to her counselor, the court recognized, may or may not have had a great impact
on her credibility. Id.
270 Robert H., 199 Conn. at 708-09, 509 A.2d at 484. The court appeared influenced by
the circumstances surrounding the incident and the victim's questionable credibility in its
decision to alter the absolute privilege to accommodate the defendant's rights. As the court's
focus on the victim's credibility throughout the decision indicates, the victim's questionable
credibility appeared to influence the court's decision. See id. at 707, 509 A.2d at 483.
271 Id. at 708-09, 509 A.2d at 484. In Robert H. the Connecticut Supreme Court adopted
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The court recognized that all rape victims are traumatized and that
rape crisis centers aid the victim in her emotional and psychological
recovery. 272 Thus, the court cautioned that "indiscriminate disclo-
sure of a rape counselor's records by a trial court to defense counsel
will surely destroy the effectiveness of a counselor-victim relation-
ship if the need for confidentiality is not exacted." 273
The Robert H. court relied on the Supreme Court decision of
Davis v. Alaska to support its holding. 274 The Robert H. court viewed
the conflicts in both Robert H. and Davis as between a defendant's
right to cross-examine an important witness and an absolute statu-
tory privilege designed to protect that same witness. 275 The Robert
H. court stated that it was following Davis in striking down a sta-
tutory privilege that limited the defendants' ability to cross-examine
prosecution witnesses. 2743 The Robert H. court determined that the
state's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of communi-
cations between a rape victim and her counselor must yield to the
defendants' rights. 277 Consequently, the Robert H. court adopted a
procedure that, according to the court, would protect the witness's
statutory right to confidentiality while simultaneously safeguarding
the defendants' right to cross-examine the witness effectively.27s
Following reasoning similar to the Connecticut Supreme
Court's reasoning in Robert H., the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
a balancing procedure that it had enuncited in prior decisions to resolve conflicts between a
statutory psychiatrist-patient privilege and defendants' rights of confrontation. Id. The court
modified the procedure to accomodate the sexual assault counselor privilege. Id. at 709, 509
A.2d at 484. In summary, the developed, procedure requires the defendant to make a
preliminary showing of impairment of his rights, the court to conduct an in camera review
to determine the information to be disclosed, and the victim to give her consent, prior to the
in camera review and prior to disclosure. Id. at 708-09, 509 A.2d at 484. If the victim's
consent is not obtained and if disclosure is determined necessary after review, the procedure
requires the court to strike the victim's testimony. Id. The Robert H. court's modifications of
the procedure concerned the in camera review and specified that the court should determine
whether the records, when compared to the victim's direct testimony, contain inconsistent
and relevant statements. Id. at 709, 509 A.2d at 484. The court defined "inconsistent state-
ments" as "verbatim accounts by the victim given to the counselor and which are directly
related to a certain element of the crime for which the defendant is standing trial." Id. at
709-10, 509 A.2d at 484. The court cautioned, however, that interpretations, recollections
and counseling notations of the counselor do not qualify as statements and that the court
cannot disclose such information to the defendant. Id. at 709, 509 A.2d at 984.
272 /d. at 710, 509 A.2d at 985.
'73 Id.
v4 Id. at 707-08, 509 A.2c1 at 483-84.
2" Id. at 707, 509 A.2d at 483.
276 Id. at 707-09, 509 A.2d at 483-84.
2" Id. at 708-09, 509 A.2r1 at 484.
OM Id.
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in a 1983 Advisory Opinion to the Howe of Representatives advised the
legislature that a statutory proposal conferring an absolute confi-
dentiality privilege to communications between a rape victim and a
rape crisis counselor, if enacted, would violate the federal and state
constitutions. 279
 The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that the
proposed statute would abrogate a criminal defendant's rights to
confront his accusers, to obtain .compulsory process and to offer
testimony of favorable witnesses. 2" The court issued its opinion in
response to a request from the state legislature. 28 ' The Rhode Island
Legislature presented the court with two bills. Both bills granted
privileges to the rape counseling relationship, but differed in the
degree of confidentiality established for communications between
the victim and the counselor. 282
 Proposal A contained an absolute
privilege283
 whereas Proposal B set forth a qualified privilege. 284
Although the court advised that Proposal A's absolute privilege




282 Id. at 1162-63.
283 Id. at 1163. In the relevant section entitled Privileged Communications, Proposal A
stated:
In the trial of every case, both civil and criminal, no sexual assault counselor
shall be competent to testify concerning any confidential communication without
the prior written consent of the sexual assault victim, nor shall a sexual assault
counselor or rape crisis center be required to disclose to the court any records,
notes, memoranda, or documents containing confidential communications with-
out the prior written consent of the sexual assault victim.
Id.
2" Id. Proposal B contained the same language as Proposal A, but added an additional
section creating an exception:
Right of defendant to seek exception to confidentiality.—... A defendant
in a criminal proceeding may petition the trial justice to issue a subpoena and/
or a subpoena duces tecum requiring the appearance of a sexual assault coun-
selor or other representative of a rape crisis center and/or the production of
records, notes, memoranda or documents in their possession. Prior to the
issuance of said subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, the trial justice shall require
the defense to show that there is reason to believe that the witness knows and/
or the material sought contains information which is relevant to a material issue
in the case. A witness responding to such a subpoena shall be interviewed, and/
or material produced in response to such a subpoena duces tecum shall be
reviewed in camera by the trial justice without counsel present. If the trial justice
determines that the witness knows and/or the material contains evidence which
would be clearly exculpatory in nature, then the trial justice shall make it known
to counsel who shalt be permitted to present such evidence at trial through the
appropriate witnesses. If the trial justice finds that no such evidence is possessed
by the witness or contained in the material, then the trial justice shall quash the
subpoena or subpoena duces tecurn.
Id.
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would violate a defendant's rights under the confrontation and
compulsory process clauses, the court stated that it approved of
Proposal B because it appropriately balanced an accused's consti-
tutional rights and a sexual assault victim's need for confidentiality
in conversations with her counselor."5
In advising the legislature that Proposal A would deprive a
criminal defendant of' his sixth amendment rights, the Rhode Island
court relied on the United States Supreme Court decisions of Davis
v. Alaska and Washington v. Texas. 2" The court interpreted these
decisions, dealing with conflicts between sixth amendment rights
and exclusionary rules, as establishing that a complete ban on cer-
tain types of evidence must always fail because such a ban improp-
erly derogates completely a defendant's interests."' Thus, the
Rhode Island court reasoned that, because an absolute privilege
constitutes a "complete ban" on a defendant's right to raise issues
or to call witnesses at trial, such an absolute privilege statute would
violate the sixth amendment by depriving a defendant of his rights
to confrontation and compulsory process. 2"
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts advised a trial court judge that under
certain circumstances the absolute privilege for rape crisis counsel-
ors contained in the Massachusetts statute must yield to the consti-
tutional rights of a defendant under the confrontation and com-
pulsory process clauses of the sixth amendment. 289 Although the
28 ' Id. at 1166.
'-"4° Id. at 1164-65. See supra MACS 135-57 and accompanying text for discussion of Davis.
See supra notes 207-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of Washington. Unlike the
Robert II. court, the Rhode Island court addressed the absolute privilege's potential violation




"" Id, at 1166.
"" Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 26(1, 491 N.E.2d 234, 238 (1986).
A trial judge issued two questions of law pursuant to Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 34 which permits trial judges to seek answers to unsettled questions of law from the
appellate court, The trial judge sought an interpretation of the Massachusetts absolute
privilege statute for rape counseling and a ruling on its constitutionality. Id. at 263, 491
N.E.2d at 236. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court transferred the questions on its
own motion. Id. The Supreme judicial Court determined that the statute precluded any
inspection of t he confidential communications. Id. at 264, 491 N.E.2d at 236. Although the
court declined to rule on the statute's constitutionality in the abstract, it stated that it perceived
circumstances under which the statute would be unconstitutional. Id. at 266-67, 491 N.E.2d
at 238. The court "outlined certain principles" to help trial judges rule on constitutional
challenges to the absolute privilege statute. Id. at 256, 491 N.E.2d at 237. The court's
"principles" are non-binding, but do indicate the Supreme Judicial Court's position. See MASS.
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trial court's constitutional question only referred to the confronta-
tion clause, the Two Juveniles court indicated that the constitutional
right to compulsory process is likely to be involved in a case where
a defendant seeks the testimony of a person who has received a
confidential communication. 290 The Two Juveniles court directed
that, if the defendant can demonstrate a legitimate need for access
to the communications and show that the protected information is
likely to be useful to his defense, the judge should review the
communications in camera. 291 Therefore, according to the Two Ju-
veniles court, to obtain an in camera review the defendant must make
a preliminary showing that he needs the evidence and that the
evidence will probably prove useful to his defense. 292
The Two Juveniles court also relied on Davis v. Alaska to support
its holding. 293 Yet, unlike the Robert H. court and the Rhode Island
court, the Supreme Judicial Court emphasized the distinction be-
tween the evidentiary rules of exclusion involved in Davis, Washing-
ton and Chambers and the testimonial privilege for rape crisis coun-
seling created by the statute. 294 The Two Juveniles court echoed the
Washington Court in noting that cases involving evidentiary rules of
exclusion could not be construed as automatically disapproving tes-
timonial privileges, which are based on entirely different consider-
ations than rules of exclusion. 295 Thus, the Two Juveniles court in-
terpreted Davis narrowly as requiring that the defense demonstrate
a witness's specific motive to lie or bias before a court can override
an absolute statute excluding potentially relevant evidence. 296 Ac-
cordingly, the court instructed the lower courts that, where a de-
fendant has made a preliminary showing of need, they should
review the communications in camera, looking specifically for evi-
dence of the victim's bias, motive to lie or statements indicating
misidentification or an inability to describe the assailant. 297
R. CRIM. P. 34. The Massachusetts Appeals Court subsequently adopted the principles enun-
ciated by the Supreme Judicial Court in an unrelated case. See Commonwealth v. Giacalone,
24 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 170-71, 507 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1987).
29° Id, at 266 n.5, 491 N.E.2d at 238 n.5.
29 ' Id. at 269, 491 N.E.2d at 239-40.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 266-67, 491 N.E.2d at 238.
294 Id.
29' Id. at 267 n.6, 491 N.E.2d at 238 n.6. Significantly, the court noted that not one of
the Supreme Court cases involving a conflict between a rule of exclusion and a defendant's
sixth amendment rights involved a testimonial privilege. Id,
296 Id. at 266-67. 491 N.E.2d at 238.
497 Id. at 269, 491 N.E.2d at 239. The Two juveniles court did not base its directions to
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In contrast to courts in Connecticut, Rhode Island and Mas-
sachusetts, the Supreme Court of Illinois in the 1988 case of People
v. Foggy held constitutional an absolute privilege statute granting
confidentiality to communications between a rape victim and a rape
counselor. 298 The defendant in Foggy abducted the victim, a twenty-
six-year-old woman, from in front of her home .at approximately
three o'clock in the morning. 239 The defendant forced the victim
into a car and drove to a nearby park where he raped her."° After
being released, the victim received medical care at a local hospital."'
She later identified the defendant as her assailant from photographs
shown to her by the police."2 Because of the trauma induced by
the rape, the victim obtained counseling from the Quad City Rape/
Sexual Assault Counseling Program (Quad City Program)." 3 Dur-
ing discovery, the defendant subpoenaed the Quad City Program,
seeking production of all communications between the victim and
her personal rape crisis counselor. 304 Both the prosecutor and the
victim's personal rape crisis counselor filed motions to quash the
subpoena on the ground that the Illinois absolute privilege statute
protected these confidential communications and that the statute
was constitutional. 3"5 The trial court quashed the subpoena, ruling
that the statutory privilege prohibiting disclosure of the communi-
cations was constitutional. 3"6 The trial court thereby denied the
defendant access to the communications, and the defendant ap-
pealed."' The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the trial court's
hold i ng."8
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the defendant
again challenged the constitutionality of the absolute privilege
the lower courts solely on its interpretation of Davis. See id. at 267-68, 491 N.E.2d at 238-
39. Rather, the court also examined the decisions of other jurisdictions dealing with assertions
of a constitutional right to an in camera inspection of information protected by a statutory
news reporter privilege. Id. at 267-68, 491 N.E.2d at 238-39. These decisions, the court
noted, although expressing the defendant's burden differently, all require the defendant to
make some preliminary showing that the privilege must be overridden. Id. at 267, 491 N,E.2d
at 238.
2" People v. Foggy, 121 111.2c1 337, 349-50, 521 N.E.2c1 86, 92 (1988).




3"Id. at 340, 521 N.E.2d at 88.
31/1
SOS Id. at 341, 521 N.E.2d at 88.
" 7 Id. at 341-42, 521 N.E.2c1 at 88.
"Id. at. 342, 521 N,E.2d at 88.
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granted by the Illinois statute, arguing that the privilege violated
his sixth amendment right of confrontation and his fourteenth
amendment right to due process. 309 The defendant requested an in
camera review of the Quad City Program's records regarding the
victim and disclosure to the defense of the victim's statements re-
calling-the occurrence."° Rejecting the defendant's arguments, the
Supreme Court of Illinois held that the absolute statutory privilege
for rape counseling was constitutionals"
The Foggy court ruled that the trial court's refusal to conduct
an in camera inspection of the victim's counseling files did not violate
the defendant's right of confrontation under the sixth amendment
nor his right to due process under the fourteenth amendment. 312
The court reasoned that the defendant's constitutional rights did
not require the abrogation of the privilege both because of the
strong public policy supporting the privilege and expressed in the
statute and because the defendant failed to provide any showing
that the files contained relevant information that the defendant
might use to exculpate himself or to impeach the victim's testi-
mony. 313 The court declined to abrogate the privilege under the
circumstances present in Foggy because breaching the privilege in
this case would require abrogations of the privilege in every case. 3 "
The court in Foggy relied on the Supreme Court decision of
Davis v. Alaska to support its holding. 313 In Davis, the Foggy court
stated, the Supreme Court held that a trial court's order, prohibiting
defense counsel from cross-examining one of the state's principle
witnesses regarding his juvenile record because a statute declared
the records confidential, violated the defendant's right of confron-
tation. 316
 According to the Foggy court, the Court in Davis reasoned
that the cross-examination was inadequate because the defense
counsel had been unable to explore possible sources of bias by
reference to the witness's juvenile record. 317 The Foggy court em-
"9 Id.
"° Id.
s" Id. at 349-50, 521 N.E.2d at 92. The Foggy court analyzed the constitutionality of the
statute under the sixth amendment confrontation clause and the fourteenth amendment due
process clause. Id. at 342, 350, 521 N.E.2d at 88, 92. The court did not address the defendant's
right to compulsory process under the sixth amendment.
512 Id. at 350, 521 N.E.2d at 92.
5 " Id.
3 " Id. at 349, 521 N.E.2d at 92.
Id. at 343-44, 521 N.E.2d at 89.
516 id. at 343, 521 N.E.2d at 89.
so Id. at 343-44, 521 N.E.2d at 89.
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phasized that the Supreme Court in Davis concluded that the state's
policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offend-
er's record was not strong enough to justify infringement on the
defendant's sixth amendment right of cross-examination. 1" 8
Ruling that the absolute privilege protecting rape crisis coun-
seling communications was constitutional, the Foggy court distin-
guished the absolute privilege for rape counseling from the statute
in Davis protecting a juvenile offender's records." Unlike the Su-
preme Court's determination regarding the statute in Davis, the
court in Foggy ruled that the absolute privilege statute evinced a
strong public policy supporting the confidentiality of communica-
tions arising from the rape crisis counseling relationship. 52° As the
Foggy court noted, the statutory privilege's expressed purpose is to
enable rape victims to obtain necessary medical care and emergency
counseling and to promote the prosecution of sex offenders."'
Further distinguishing Foggy from Davis, the Foggy court stated that
unlike the defendant in Davis who showed that the protected infor-
mation was relevant to show the witness's possible bias and who had
no other means to reveal such bias, the defendant in Foggy showed
no indication that the victim's communications would provide a
source of impeachment unavailable from other sources, 322 Thus,
because of the strong public policy supporting the confidentiality
of rape crisis counseling communications and the absence of a
showing by the defense that these communications represented
significant and irreplaceable information, the Foggy court ruled that
the defendant's rights of confrontation and due process did not
require abrogation of the privilege. 323
To support its holding that the absolute privilege was consti-
tutional and that the defendant's constitutional rights did not re-
318 /d. at 344, 521 N.E.2d at 89.
'' 19 Id. at 344, 350, 521 N.E.2d.at 89, 92.
12° Id. at 350, 521 N.E.2d at 92.
321 Id. at 348, 521 N.E.2d at 91. The Foggy court quoted the stated purpose of the statute:
(a) Purpose. This section is intended to protect victims of rape, deviate
sexual assault, and incest from public disclosure of statements they make in
confidence to counselors of organizations established to help them. Because of
the fear and stigma that often results from those crimes, many victims hesitate
to seek help even where it is available at no cost to them. As a result they not
only fail to receive needed medical care and emergency counseling, but may
lack the psychological support necessary to report the crime and aid the police
in preventing future crimes.
Id. at 339-40, 521 N.E.2d at 87 (citing statute).
322 Id. at 350, 521 N.E.2d at 92.
"3 Id. at 348-50, 521 N.E.2d at 91-92.
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quire an in camera review of the rape crisis counseling communi-
cations, the Foggy court also relied on the Supreme Court decision
of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie. 324 In Ritchie, the Foggy court stated, the
Supreme Court considered whether a statute, declaring confidential
the files of a child abuse investigatory agency, violated the defen-
dant's constitutional rights under both the confrontation and com-
pulsory process clauses. 325 The Foggy court noted that a plurality of
the Ritchie court, characterizing the right of confrontation as a trial
right, concluded that failure to disclose the agency's records did not
violate the defendant's confrontation right because the defendant
physically faced the witnesses against him and the defense counsel
was able to cross-examine all the trial witnesses. fully. 326
The Foggy court discussed the Supreme Court's consideration
of the compulsory process claim in Ritchie, noting that the Court
addressed this claim in terms of due process. 327 The Foggy court
stated that a majority of 'the Supreme Court in Ritchie concluded
that the defendant's rights to due process entitled him to have the
trial court conduct an in camera review of the agency files, despite
the statutory privilege. 325 The Foggy court emphasized that the stat-
524 Id. at 344-47, 521 N.E.2d at 89-91.
525 Id. at 345, 521 N.E.2d at 90.
3261d.
"7 Id. at 346, 521 N.E.2d at 90. Receiving this direction from the Supreme Court, the
Foggy court may have decided to address the substance of the compulsory process guarantees
under a due process analysis, particularly because the defendant did not claim a violation of
his compulsory process rights. See Id. at 346-50, 521 N.E.2d at 90-92. Indeed, the Foggy
court did rely on the Supreme Court's due process discussion in Ritchie to hold that the
defendant's constitutional rights did not require an in camera review. See id. Nevertheless,
although the Foggy court purported to analyze the statute's constitutionality under the clue
process clause, the court never mentioned the defendant's right to place exculpatory evidence
before the jury, or the argument that the privilege denied the defendant due process because
it shielded statements of the victim that may have been exculpatory. Rather, the court only
considered the impeachment value of the statements. According to the court, the defendant's
constitutional claims merely amounted to his right of confrontation. Id. at 347, 521 N.E.2d
at 91. As the court stated, "we are therefore met with an issue unresolved by Ritchie: whether
an absolute privilege must yield to a criminal defendant's pretrial discovery request for
otherwise privileged information that may provide material for use in cross-examining wit-
nesses." Id. Although the court discussed the Ritchie plurality's definition of the right of
confrontation as a trial right satisfied if defense counsel is able to cross-examine all the
witnesses fully, the court still proceeded to consider whether the defendant possessed a right
to obtain information during pretrial discovery to use in cross-examination. Id. at 345-47,
521 N.E.2d at 90-91. Consequently, although the court stated its holding in terms of both
the due process clause and the confrontation clause, the court really only decided the issue
of whether the privilege infringed on the defendant's right of cross-examination under the
confrontation clause. Id. at 347, 349, 521 N.E.2d 91, 92.
525 Id. at 90.
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ute in 'Ritchie was not absolute, but permitted disclosure to a court
of competent jurisdiction."" The Foggy court also emphasized that
the Supreme Court in Ritchie stated that it expressed no opinion on
whether an in camera review would have been required if the statute
absolutely prohibited disclosure"
Distinguishing the Illinois statute protecting rape counseling
communications from the statute at issue in Ritchie, the Foggy court
ruled that the defendant's constitutional rights did not require an
in camera review of the communications."' Unlike the qualified
privilege in Ritchie, the Foggy court confronted an absolute privilege
statute, prohibiting disclosure under all circumstances. 332 In decid-
ing whether the absolute privilege must yield, as did the qualified
privilege in Ritchie, the Foggy court found significant the legislature's
commitment to an absolute privilege, designed to protect rape vic-
tims from public disclosure of statements they made in confidence
to personal counselors. 333 As the Foggy court noted, the statute
originally allowed only a qualified privilege permitting an in camera
disclosure."'" The legislature, however, decided to strengthen the
privilege and amended the statute, making it absolute and adding
a penalty provision declaring an unauthorized disclosure a misde-
meanor. 335 Accordingly, the Foggy court ruled that, unlike the qual-
ified privilege in Ritchie, the absolute privilege prohibited disclosure
of the files even for an in camera review. 338
Holding that the defendant's constitutional rights did not re-
quire an in camera review, the Foggy court emphasized the damage
to the counseling relationship that an in camera review would in-
flict."' If an, in camera review was permissible, the Foggy court stated,
a rape crisis counselor could not guarantee confidentiality to a
victim. 338
 Rather, a counselor would have to include a special ad-
monition to notify the victim of the very real possibility that a judge
would review the records.'" The Foggy court concluded that this
possibility of disclosure would seriously undermine the valuable and
329 Id.
3" Id.
33i at 347, 521 N,E,2d at 91,
!In
3" Id. at 347-49, 521 N.E.2d at 91.
"4 Id. at 348, 521 N.E.2d at 91.
"5 /d.
"6 Id. at 347, 521 N.E.2d at 91.
337
	 at 347-50, 521 N.E.2d at 91-92.
"" Id. at 349-50, 521 N.E.2d at 92.
333 Id. at 350, 521 N,E,2d at 92,
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beneficial services performed by rape crisis centers and protected
by the statute. 34° In sum, because of the strong public policy sup-
porting the absolute privilege and the defendant's failure to dem-
onstrate that the files would provide a source of impeaching infor-
mation, the Foggy court held that the trial court's refusal to conduct
an in camera examination of the victim's counseling files- did not
violate the defendant's rights of confrontation or due process."'
In summary, state courts that have addressed the constitution-
ality of an absolute privilege for rape crisis counseling have reached
different conclusions. The Rhode Island court in its Advisory Opin-
ion, the Connecticut court in Robert H. and the Massachusetts court
in Two Juveniles all determined that an absolute privilege providing
no accommodation for the defendant's sixth amendment rights was
unconstitutional. Each of these courts, however, recognized the im-
portant interests supporting an absolute privilege for communica-
tions between a rape victim and her rape crisis counselor. Thus,
these courts refused to completely abrogate the privilege. To rectify
the constitutional infirmity, each of these courts recommended dif-
ferent procedures to ensure the defendant satisfaction of his rights.
In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court in Foggy determined that
the interests supporting an absolute privilege for rape counseling
were sufficiently compelling so as to justify any infringement on a
defendant's sixth amendment rights. Thus, the Foggy court held
that the absolute privilege was constitutional.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ABSOLUTE
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE FOR THE RAPE CRISIS COUNSELING
RELATIONSHIP
Several state courts have addressed the constitutionality of an
absolute testimonial privilege for the rape crisis counseling relation-
ship. 342
 Most of these courts determined that an absolute privilege
unconstitutionally deprives a rape defendant of his rights under
the confrontation and compulsory process clauses. 343 One court,
34° Id.
Id. at 349-50, 521 N.E.2d at 92.
]" In re Robert H., 199 Conn. 693, 706, 509 A.2d 475, 483 (1986); Foggy, 121 III. 2d at
342, 521 N.E.2d at 88; Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 263, 491 N.E.2d
234, 236 (1986); Commonwealth v. Samuels, 354 Pa. Super. 128, 134, 511 A.2d 221, 224
(1986); Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161, 1163 (R.I. 1983).
See supra notes 252-341 and accompanying text for a discussion of these decisions.
343 See Robert H., 199 Conn. at 706-09, 509 A.2d at 483-84; Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. at
266, 491 N.E.2d at 238; Advisory Opinion. 469 A.2d at 1166.
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however, held that an absolute privilege is constitutional." 4 Those
courts holding an absolute privilege unconstitutional have used in-
consistent reasoning. Although they relied on the same Supreme
Court decisions to support a holding of unconstitutionality, 345
 the
courts' interpretations of these Supreme Court decisions and their
overall reasoning differ significantly. 316 Moreover, all of these de-
cisions were issued prior to the Supreme Court decision of Pennsyl-
vania v. Ritchie, in which the Court elaborated upon the rights of
cross-examination guaranteed by the confrontation clause and
chose to deal with the defendant's compulsory process clause claim
by applying a due process analysis."' In contrast, the one court
holding an absolute rape counseling privilege constitutional reached
this conclusion relying on the Supreme Court decision in Ritchie. 3"
The Ritchie decision provides a new view of the conflict. The
Ritchie decision supports the conclusion that an absolute privilege
for communications between rape victims and rape crisis counselors
is constitutional. The compelling state interests and the individual
privacy interests of the victim that support this testimonial privilege
justify any speculative infringement on the defendant's sixth
amendment rights.
A. The Confrontation Clause Challenge
Criminal rape defendants have challenged an absolute privilege
for the rape crisis counseling relationship as a violation of their
rights to confrontation under the sixth amendment. 349
 Because the
victim's statements to her counselor may be inconsistent with her
statements at trial, defendants have asserted that they should have
access to all such prior statements for use during cross-examination
of the victim to impeach her testimony or reveal possible biases or
ulterior motives. 350
 An absolute privilege prohibiting disclosure of
349 Foggy, 121 111. 2d at 349-50, 521 N.E.2d at 92.
3'S
	 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). See supra notes 135-57 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Davis and notes 207-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Washington and Chambers.
39°
	 Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d 1161 with Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 491 N.E.2d
234.
347
 See Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989, 994, 1001. See supra notes 158-203 and accompanying
text.
348 Foggy, 121 111. 2d at 344-47, 521 N.E.2d at 90-91.
343
 See Robert H., 199 Conn. at 705, 509 A.2d at 482. See supra notes 252-341 and
accompanying text.
350
 Robert H., 199 Conn. at 705, 509 A.2d at 482. See supra notes 127-29 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of a defendant's arguments under the confrontation clause.
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these statements, defendants have alleged, impermissibly shields
these statements and violates their rights to effective cross-exami-
nation under the confrontation clause.35 '
Addressing the constitutionality of an absolute privilege for the
rape crisis counseling relationship in light of a defendant's confron-
tation clause challenge, the state courts in the cases of In re Robert
H., Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, and People v. Foggy and the Rhode
Island court in its Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives all
relied upon Davis v. Alaska. 352
 In Davis, the Supreme Court held
that a state evidence rule that forbade the disclosure of juvenile
records in judicial proceedings denied a defendant his right of
effective cross-examination under the confrontation clause because
the rule restricted the scope of a defendant's cross-examination
questioning of a key witness against the defendant. 353
 Although
these state courts all relied on Davis, each court interpreted Davis'
holding differently.
The Connecticut court in Robert H. and the Rhode Island court
in its Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives both relied upon
Davis to hold that an absolute privilege for rape crisis counseling
violates a criminal defendant's right to effective cross-examina-
tion. 354
 These two courts interpreted Davis as establishing that the
right of confrontation requires defense access to all information
that may possibly improve the effectiveness of cross-examination at
trial. 355
 Both courts viewed Davis as authorizing the abrogation of
an absolute privilege statute because, like the statute protecting
juvenile offenders in Davis, the privilege completely banned the
introduction of certain evidence and possibly inhibited the defense
from conducting an effective cross-examination.356
 These two courts
further interpreted Davis as mandating that, where a conflict with
a defendant's confrontation rights arises, the right of a defendant
"' See id. at 705, 509 A.2d at 482.
"2 Robert H., 199 Conn. at 707-08, 509 A.2d at 483-84; Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. at 266-
67, 491 N.E.2d at 238; Foggy, 121 111. 2d at 343-44, 521 N.E.2d at 89; Advisory Opinion, 469
A.2d at 1165.
'" Davis, 415 U.S. at 318. See supra notes 135-57 and accompanying text.
3" Robert H., 199 Conn. at 707-09, 509 A.2d at 483-84; Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d at
1165.
3" See Robert H., 199 Conn. at 707-09, 509 A.2d at 483-84; Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d
at 1165.
"6 Robert H., 199 Conn. at 707-09, 509 A.2d at 483-84; Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d at
1165.
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to effective cross-examination takes precedence regardless of the
opposing interests supporting the exclusion of evidence."'
In contrast, the Two Juveniles court and the Foggy court, al-
though reaching different conclusions regarding the constitution-
ality of the absolute privilege, both distinguished the situation be-
fore the Court in Davis from the conflict between an absolute
privilege for rape counseling and a defendant's rights to effective
cross-examination. 358 The Two Juveniles court, interpreting Davis as
defining the right of confrontation to include access to information
for possible use during cross-examination, ultimately concluded that
the absolute privilege for rape counseling must yield to a defen-
dant's right of confrontation under certain circumstances. 359 The
court, however, recognized a distinction between the evidentiary
rules of exclusion at issue in Davis and testimonial privileges."° The
Two Juveniles court indicated that, because testimonial privileges are
based on entirely different considerations than rules of exclusion,
cases involving evidentiary rules of exclusion, such as Davis, do not
automatically require abrogation of testimonial privileges upon es-
tablishment of a confrontation right violation."' The Two Juveniles
court further noted that the United States Supreme Court had
never decided a conflict between a defendant's sixth amendment
rights and a testimonial privilege."52 According to the Two Juveniles
court, therefore, the interests underlying the privilege must be
considered before a court, relying on Davis, may override an abso-
lute privilege for rape counseling.'
Similarly, the court in Foggy distinguished the rape counseling
privilege from the exclusionary rule in Davis prohibiting the intro-
duction of juvenile offender's records by emphasizing that the priv-
ilege was supported by a strong public policy in favor of confiden-
tiality."1 Unlike the rule in Davis, which merely protected a juvenile
offender from embarrassment or a blemished reputation, the ab-
357 id .
358 Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. at 266-67, 491 N.E.2d at 238; Foggy, 121 III. 2d at 344, 350,
521 N.E.2d at 89, 92.
31" Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. at 266-67, 991 N.E.2d at 238. See supra notes 289-297 and
accompanying text fin a discussion of Two Juveniles.




364 Foggy, 121 111. 2d at 398, 349-50, 521 N.E.2d at 91, 92. See supra notes 298-341 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Foggy.
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solute privilege, the Foggy court emphasized, promotes the prose-
cution of sex offenders, encourages the rehabilitation of rape vic-
tims, and protects victims from the suffering that disclosure of such
confidences would inflict. 365
 Furthermore, the Foggy court stated
that, unlike the defendant in Davis, the defendant in Foggy offered
no reason to believe that the victim's counseling files might include
specific information to show the victim's bias or motive to fabri-
cate. 366
 Thus, distinguishing Davis, the Foggy court held that the
defendant's right of confrontation did not require abrogation of
the privilege. 367
Unlike the other state courts addressing the constitutionality of
an absolute privilege, the Foggy court decided the issue after the
Supreme Court decision of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie and relied on the
Ritchie plurality's opinion in holding an absolute privilege constitu-
tional under the confrontation clause. 368 Relying on the Ritchie plu-
rality's opinion, the Foggy court recognized the right of confronta-
tion as a trial right, violated only by restrictions on cross-
examination operating at trial. 369 The Foggy court relied on the
Ritchie plurality's statement that Davis should not be interpreted
broadly to transform the confrontation clause into a constitutionally
compelled right to pretrial discovery. 979 The Foggy court ultimately
ruled that the absolute privilege did not violate the defendant's
right of confrontation."'
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, issued after the state court decisions
holding an absolute privilege unconstitutional, the United States
Supreme Court also divided over the proper interpretation of Davis
and the scope of a defendant's right of effective cross-examination
guaranteed under the confrontation clause. 372
 In analyzing a statute
protecting child abuse investigatory files, a plurality of the Ritchie
Court narrowly interpreted Davis as establishing that the right of
effective cross-examination is a trial right and demands only that
no improper restrictions inhibit a defendant's actual questioning at
trial of an adverse witness."' According to the plurality, the right
" Foggy, 121 111. 2d at 348, 521 N.E.2d at 91.
"66
 Id. at 350, 521 N.E.2d at 92.
3112 Id. at 349-50, 521 N.E.2d at 92.
1116 Id. at 344-46, 521 N.E.2d at 89-90.
"69 Id. at 345, 521 N.E.2d at 90.
'° Id.
471 Id. at 350, 521 N.E.2d at 92.
"2 107 S. Ct. 989 (plurality opinion). See supra notes 158-203 and accompanying text.
373 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 999.
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to effective cross-examination is not a right of pretrial discovery to
obtain statements prior to trial for use during cross-examination. 374
In contrast, the dissent in Ritchie indicated that denying a defendant
pretrial access to statements of a victim that might form the basis
of cross-examination violated a defendant's right to confronta-
tion.375
The Ritchie plurality also rejected interpreting the confronta-
tion clause and the Davis decision as requiring a court to inquire
into the actual effectiveness of the cross-examination. 375 According
to the plurality, cross-examination is effective if a defendant is
permitted the opportunity to question an adverse witness at trial
without substantial restriction." 7 The right of effective cross-ex-
amination, the Ritchie plurality emphasized, does not include a guar-
antee to a defendant of all possible opportunities, such as pretrial
discovery of privileged statements, that might increase the effec-
tiveness of cross-examination."8 Thus, the Ritchie plurality held that
denying the defendant access to the information contained in the
Children and Youth Services' files did not violate the defendant's
right of confrontation:" Because the defendant in Ritchie was able
to question the victim on cross-examination without restriction, the
statute did not inhibit the defendant's constitutional right of cross-
examination established by Davis. 38° From the Ritchie plurality's per-
spective, the problem in Davis was that the defendant could not
question the juvenile about his criminal record because the statute
protected the confidentiality of juvenile offenders' records."' The
statute restricted the cross-examination questioning at trial and pro-
hibited the defense from inquiring into a subject of evident im-
peachment value."2 The constitutional problem in Davis was not
that the statute denied the defendant access to information con-
tained in the juvenile records, but that the defense could not ques-
tion the juvenile witness about his record or probationary status."'
Pursuant to the Ritchie plurality opinion, the absolute privilege
for rape crisis counseling, which shields statements of the victim-
37-1 Id.
973 Id. at 1009 (Brennan,,}., dissenting).
37" See 107 S. Ct, at 999.
977
", Id.
37 " Id. at 1000.
"" Id.
"I Id. at 999.
"2 Id.
3" 5 Id. at 1000.
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complainant communicated during counseling, does not deny a
defendant his right to effective cross-examination. Disallowing the
defense access to counseling communications does not restrict the
questioning of a victim-complainant during cross-examination. The
privilege does not preclude the defense from inquiring into any
subject; it simply prohibits the defense from obtaining the counsel-
ing communications. Despite the existence of the privilege, the
defendant may confront this witness against him—the victim—and
may cross-examine her without limitation to undermine her testi-
mony. Accordingly, an absolute privilege for communications be-
tween rape victims and rape crisis counselors does not violate the
Ritchie plurality's view of defendants' rights to an effective cross-
examination under the confrontation clause. 884
Because the plurality's interpretation of Davis is not the ruling
of the Court, the view of the dissent in Ritchie may ultimately pre-
vail."6
 The dissent asserted that the right of effective cross-exami-
nation may indeed require the production of potentially relevant
statements of the victim prior to trial to ensure that cross-exami-
nation is as effective as possible. 886
 Under this view that the con-
frontation clause guarantees a right to pretrial discovery, an abso-
lute privilege for the rape crisis counseling relationship may
infringe on a defendant's rights."' The state courts that decided an
absolute privilege infringed upon a defendant's right of confron-
tation also interpreted the right as including a right to obtain access
to information that might improve the effectiveness of cross-ex-
amination. 388
Nevertheless, even if the dissent's view of Davis prevails, Davis
should not be read as the Rhode Island court in its Advisory Opinion
and the Connecticut court in Robert H. advocated."9 Davis does not
require the automatic overruling of an absolute privilege simply
because the privilege infringes on a defendant's rights by absolutely
prohibiting disclosure.") Instead, courts should recognize, as did
the court in Two Juveniles, that Davis does not automatically require
384 See id.
385 See supra notes 183-203 for a discussion of the dissenting and concurring opinions
in Ritchie.
3" 107 S. Ct. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
387 See id.
sea
	 supra notes 256-297 and accompanying text.
383 See supra notes 262-78 and accompanying text for a case discussion of Robert H. See
supra notes 279-88 and accompanying text for a case discussion of the Rhode Island court's
Advisory Opinion.
38°
	 Davis, 415 U.S. at 319. See supra notes 135-57 and accompanying text.
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abrogation of a testimonial privilege because testimonial privileges
protect different interests than rules of exclusion,"' Thus, courts
should consider the interests underlying the privilege when ad-
dressing a confrontation clause challenge."2 In Davis, the Supreme
Court discussed at length the interests that supported the statute
protecting the confidentiality of juvenile offenders before conclud-
ing that the defendant's right to confrontation was paramount to
the state's interest. 3 The Court ruled that the state interest was
not compelling enough to justify the infringement on the defen-
dant's rights.'" Accordingly, the Davis decision indicates that courts
should consider the underlying public and private interests sup-
porting an absolute privilege for rape counseling when confronted
with a rape defendant's confrontation clause challenge to the priv-
ilege. Subsection C discusses these interests and concludes that, if
the right of confrontation ultimately does include pretrial access to
privileged information, the important private and public interests
supporting an absolute rape counseling privilege justify any poten-
tial infringement on a defendant's sixth amendment right of con-
frontation. "5
B. The Compulsory Process Challenge
Criminal rape defendants have also challenged an absolute
privilege for communications between a rape victim and a rape
crisis counselor as a violation of their rights to compulsory process
under the sixth amendment."6 They have claimed that, because the
records of a counselor may contain potentially exculpatory evidence
and because a counselor may possess relevant knowledge transmit-
ted to her by the victim, their rights to compulsory process demand
that the court compel the testimony of the counselor and the pro-
duction of the records."' In the state case of In re Robert H. in which
the court addressed the constitutionality of the absolute privilege,
the defendants alleged a compulsory process violation. 398 The
") See Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. at 267, 491 N.E.2d at 238.
"2 See Davis, 415 U.S. at 319.
30 Id.
a s Id, at 315.
'"' See infra notes 423-445 and accompanying text.
3" See Robert H., 199 Conn. at 705, 509 A.2d at 482. See supra notes 252-341 and
accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the defendant's
arguments under the compulsory process clause.
"" Robert H„ 199 Conn. at 705, 509 A.2d at 482.
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Rhode Island Supreme Court in its Advisory Opinion to the House of
Representatives and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in its
Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles decision also mentioned the absolute
privilege's potential compulsory process violation. 59" Because the
Ritchie plurality opinion undermines a defendant's constitutional
challenge to the absolute privilege under the confrontation clause
by limiting the right of cross-examination to a trial right, only a
defendant's compulsory process challenge survives if the plurality
opinion remains the law. 4°°
Although the state courts in Robert H. and Foggy noted that an
absolute privilege implicates a defendant's compulsory process
rights, these courts grounded their decisions in the confrontation
clause, with little or no discussion of the defendant's compulsory
process rights. 40 ' Thus, these decisions offer little assistance in de-
ciding whether the absolute privilege for rape counseling violates a
rape defendant's rights to compulsory process. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court in its Advisory Opinion and the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court in Two Juveniles, however, did consider Su-
preme Court cases addressing the defendants' rights under the
compulsory process clause. 402 The Rhode Island court considered
the conflict between an absolute privilege and a rape defendant's
compulsory process rights to be identical to the situation in Wash-
ington v. Texas, which involved an evidentiary rule prohibiting co-
participants of the same crime from testifying for one another.405
Consequently, the Rhode Island court interpreted Washington as
requiring the abrogation of the absolute privilege because, similar
to the rule at issue in Washington, it constituted a complete ban on
potential evidence. 404
In contrast, the Supreme Judicial Court in Two Juveniles distin-
guished the rules in the Supreme Court cases of Washington and
Chambers v. Mississippi from a testimonial privilege for rape coun-
seling. 405 Quoting the Washington Court, the Two Juveniles court
emphasized that testimonial privileges are based on entirely differ-
4" Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d at 1163; Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. at 266 n.5, 491 N.E.2d
at 238 n.5:
4°° See Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 989. See supra notes 158-203 and accompanying text.
401 See Robert H., 199 Conn. at 705-08, 509 A.2d at 482-83; Foggy, 121 111. 2d at 347,
350, 521 N.E.2d at 91, 92.
402 Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d at 1165; Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. at 266-67, 491 N.E.2d
at 238.
4°] Advisory Opinion, 469 A.2d at 1165.
904 Id.
105 Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. at 266-67, 491 N.E.2d at 238.
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ent considerations than evidentiary rules, such as the disqualifica-
tion for interest rule in Washington. 4 "" Thus, in contrast to the Rhode
Island court's view, the Two Juveniles court recognized that Washing-
ton could not be interpreted as automatically demanding the abro-
gation of the absolute privilege for rape counseling. 4 °7 Thus, the
Two Juveniles court ruled that the defense must demonstrate a wit-
ness's specific motive to lie or bias before a court can override the
absolute privilege. 4"8
Analysis of the Supreme Court decisions of Washington v. Texas
and Chambers v. Mississippi reveals that the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's view that the compulsory process clause demands the yield-
ing of an absolute privilege is unfounded. 4 °9 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of these cases in Two ju-
veniles is more plausible. In Washington, the Supreme Court ex-
pressly stated that its decision 'should not be interpreted as disap-
proving of testimonial privileges because they are supported by
considerations different than those which support typical exclusion-
ary rules of' evidence. 41 "
Courts, therefore, should closely examine the interests under-
lying an absolute privilege for rape counseling in deciding whether
to abrogate the privilege. In addition to recognizing the special
interests underlying privileges, the Washington Court considered the
interests supporting the evidentiary rules disqualifying copartici-
parits. 4 " In Washington, the Court discussed the state interests sup-
porting the evidentiary rule in depth before it rejected the state's
justifications for the rule and ruled that the state arbitrarily denied
the defendant the right to introduce a witness whose testimony was
relevant and material to his defense. 412 Accordingly, the Washington
decision indicates that when addressing a defendant's compulsory
process claim, courts should evaluate the opposing interests under-
lying the evidentiary rule or privilege to determine if such interests
justify infringement on the defendant's right of compulsory pro-
cess; the Washington decision does not state that the compulsory
process clause absolutely prohibits all complete restrictions on the
defendant's ability to obtain witnesses and/or evidence in his favor.
4"" Id. at 267,491 N.E.2d at 238.
4°7 See id.
"8 1d. at 269,491 N.E.2d at 239.
4"" See supra notes 207-226 and accompanying text for a discussion of Washington and
Chambers.
41 " Washington, 388 U.S. at 23 n.21.
4 " Id. at 20-21.
412 1d. at 22-23,
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Similarly, in the case of Chambers v. Mississippi, the Supreme
Court indicated that courts should examine the interests underlying
the rule of exclusion or privilege in deciding whether an infringe-
ment on the defendant's right to compulsory process is justified. In
Chambers, the Court faced the defendant's claim that the operation
of state hearsay rules violated his right to call witnesses in his fa-
vor. 4 ' 3
 The Court applied a due process analysis to assess whether
the defendant received a fair trial. 414 The Court's choice of a due
process analysis and its discussion of the interests underlying the
hearsay rules indicate that where a defendant asserts a violation of
his right to compulsory process, courts should weigh the interests
that justify infringement on a defendant's rights before overriding
an evidentiary rule restricting a defendant's compulsory process
rights.
The Supreme Court decision of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie also sup-
ports the conclusion that an analysis under the compulsory process
clause involves considering competing interests and balancing these
interests against a defendant's rights. In response to the defendant's
claimed denial of compulsory process in Ritchie, the Supreme Court
chose to apply a due process analysis under its fourteenth amend-
ment precedents, establishing that the government has the obligation
to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the
accused and material to guilt or innocence. 415 Because the Children
and Youth Services agency in Ritchie was a government agency, the
fourteenth amendment precedents that required the government
to disclose exculpatory evidence in its possession applied. 4 ' 6
In contrast, the majority of rape crisis centers are private insti-
tutions, not government agencies. Thus, the due process analysis
that the Supreme Court applied in Ritchie may not govern the
conflict involving an absolute privilege for communications between
a rape victim and a rape crisis counselor. Although courts may
decide not to rely on the fourteenth amendment precedents dealing
with the government's obligation to reveal exculpatory evidence,
however, courts may choose to address a defendant's argument that
the constitution guarantees a right to obtain exculpatory evidence
under the more general protections of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment:417 Finally, courts will probably return
4'1 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298.
414 Id.
41
 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1001.
416 See id.
4 ' 7 See Foggy, 121 III. 2d at 342, 521 N.E.2d at 88.
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to the compulsory process clause to assess the constitutionality of
an absolute privilege where a defendant claims that the privilege
unconstitutionally restricts his access to exculpatory evidence.
Although not directly on point, the Ritchie decision nevertheless
offers some guidance for courts addressing a compulsory process
challenge to an absolute privilege for rape counseling. The Supreme
Court in Ritchie stated that although it addressed the defendant's
claim by reference to due process, the compulsory process clause
provided no greater protection. 4 ' 8 Therefore, a defendant's rights
under the compulsory process clause must be satisfied by less than
complete disclosure. An in camera review, such as the procedure
fashioned by the Court in Ritchie, will satisfy a defendant's rights to
compulsory process. Accordingly, the Ritchie decision establishes at
a minimum that a rape defendant is not entitled to complete dis-
closure of rape counseling files by virtue of his right to compulsory
process.
Furthermore, the Ritchie Court's indication that an in camera
review will satisfy a criminal defendant's compulsory process rights
also supports the conclusion that a compulsory process analysis
involves consideration of the interests underlying any restriction on
the defendant's ability to call witnesses or to obtain evidence. By
choosing an in camera review, a court recognizes that important
interests oppose a defendant's rights. An in camera review is an
accommodation to allow a defendant his constitutional rights and
to avoid disregarding the opposing interests. In Ritchie, the state's
interests supporting confidentiality of the CYS's files were the pub-
lic's interests in the investigation, discovery, prosecution and treat-
ment of child abuse. 4 " Recognizing the strength of such interests,
the Court ruled that on remand the trial court should review the
files in camera to determine if they contained material informa-
tion. 42° Accordingly, Ritchie supports a balancing of interests ap-
proach in addressing a rape defendant's compulsory process chal-
lenge to an absolute privilege statute for rape counseling.
In summary, as the Supreme Court decisions of Washington,
Chambers and Ritchie indicate, the compulsory process clause does
not automatically require the abrogation of a rule that restricts a
defendant's compulsory process rights. These decisions establish
that a compulsory process analysis should involve consideration of
-11 " Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1001.
,"' Id. at 1003.
- ' 2" Id. at 1002.
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the interests underlying a testimonial privilege for the rape coun-
seling relationship. As the Supreme Court in Washington stated,
testimonial privileges are based on unique considerations different
from other rules of evidence. 42 ' Weightier considerations support
testimonial privileges, particularly the absolute privilege for rape
crisis counseling. Accordingly, when determining the constitution-
ality of an absolute privilege for rape counseling under a due pro-
cess analysis, a court must weigh the private and public interests
supporting the absolute privilege against the defendant's right to
compulsory process. Subsection C discusses this balancing of inter-
ests analysis and concludes that the compelling private and public
interests underlying the absolute rape counseling privilege justify
any potential infringement on a defendant's compulsory process
righ ts. 422
C. The Compelling Public and Private Interests Supporting an Absolute
Privilege for Rape Counseling Justify any Potential Infringement on a
Defendant's Sixth Amendment Rights
An absolute privilege for rape counseling potentially may in-
fringe upon a rape defendant's compulsory process right to call
witnesses in his favor and to place exculpatory evidence before the
jury. A compulsory process analysis thus requires evaluation of the
interests underlying a testimonial privilege to determine whether
the privilege unconstitutionally infringes upon a defendant's sixth
amendment rights. Under the Ritchie plurality's interpretation of
the confrontation clause, an absolute privilege for rape counseling
does not violate a rape defendant's right of confrontation. 423 If the
views of the dissent and the concurring Justice in Ritchie prevail,
however, an absolute privilege may indeed infringe upon a defen-
dant's right of cross-examination guaranteed by the confrontation
clause of the sixth amendment. 424 If the Ritchie dissent's opinion of
the right of confrontation becomes law, a confrontation clause anal-
ysis will require consideration of the interests supporting an abso-
lute privilege to address a constitutional challenge to the privilege.
Applying such a sixth amendment analysis, the compelling public
42 ' Washington, 388 U.S. at 23 n.21.
422 See infra notes 423-445 and accompanying text.
4" See Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 998-1000. See supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
42' See Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring), 1006 (Brennan, J., Marshall,
J., dissenting). See supra notes 183-203 and accompanying text.
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and private interests supporting the absolute privilege for rape
counseling justify any infringement on the defendant's rights.
Compelling public and private interests support an absolute
testimonial privilege for communications between a rape victim and
her counselor. Pursuant to the public function theory of testimonial
privileges, the privilege for rape counseling promotes, maintains
and protects a socially valuable relationship. 425 The rape counseling
relationship clearly furthers several important public interests. First,
the rape counseling relationship assists rape victims in their recovery
from the trauma that rape inflicts.42" The relationship enables vic-
tims to recover from the disruption of emotional stability caused by
the rape and to return to their lives as professionals, wives and
mothers. 427 Clearly, society possesses a compelling interest in the
rehabilitation of rape victims. Additionally, the rape counseling re-
lationship promotes the judicial process itself because the relation-
ship provides a victim with the necessary psychological and emo-
tional support necessary to report the crime and to aid the police
and the prosecution. 428
Confidentiality is essential to the continued existence and ef-
fectiveness of the rape counseling relationship. 42" Without .an as-
surance of confidentiality, a victim may avoid treatment altogether
or may withhold certain personal feelings and thoughts because she
fears disclosure."" The communications are so extremely personal
that the mere possibility of exposure to just one individual other
than a personal counselor may inhibit a victim. Without confiden-
tiality, victims will not be able to develop the trust within the coun-
seling relationship that is essential for effective therapy."'
Without the protection of a privilege of confidentiality, rape
crisis centers will be forced to reveal the contents of communications
exchanged between a victim and a counselor when the defense
demands disclosure. Rape crisis counselors will be unable to assure
confidentiality to rape victims seeking their help. Thus, rape victims
may choose not to form such relationships or will refrain from
425 See In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 58, 428 A.2ci at 147 (Larsen, 1, dissenting). See supra
notes 67-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the public function theory of privi-
leges.
..42'i
	 re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 58, 428 A.2d at 147 (Larsen, J., dissenting); Foggy, 121 Ill.
2d at 348, 521 N.E.2d at 91; Robert II., 199 Conn. at 706, 710, 509 A.2d at 483, 485.
427
	 re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 58, 428 A.2d at 147 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
428 Foggy, 121 111. 2d at 348, 521 N.E.2d at 91.
42" In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at .55, 428 A.2d at 146 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
13" Id. at 53, 428 A.2d at 145 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
. 131 Id. at 54, 428 A.2d at 145 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
472	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:411
communication in an open and honest manner necessary to the
growth and proper function of the relationship. Unable to perform
their services effectively, rape crisis centers may be forced to shut
their doors and rape victims will no longer have a sanctuary where
they can receive the help, support, and counseling they need. Per-
mitting disclosure may thus inflict severe damage on the relation-
ship and destroy the public interests that the privilege promotes
and protects.
The private function theory of testimonial privileges also sup-
ports an absolute privilege for rape counseling. 432
 The privilege
protects the victim's privacy interests in the communications ex-
changed between the victim and the counselor. 433 Because of the
nature of a rape violation and the emotional and psychological
reactions all victims experience in the rape's aftermath, these com-
munications involve private matters of an extremely sensitive na-
ture. 4 m Such communications contain not only the details of the
rape, but also the victim's expressions of guilt, self-blame, shame,
degradation, embarrassment, anger and fear. 435 The absolute priv-
ilege guards the victim's privacy interests in these communications
and protects the victim from the personal injury that disclosure of
these confidences would cause her. Furthermore, by assuring con-
fidentiality, the privilege enables the victim to obtain the necessary
therapeutic treatment to help her recover from rape trauma syn-
drome. 436 Accordingly, the rape counseling privilege serves vital
private interests of the victim.
The public interests and the privacy interests of the victim that
support an absolute privilege for rape counseling justify any poten-
tial infringement on the defendant's rights to confrontation and
compulsory process. Any potential infringement is justified because
of the speculative nature of a rape defendant's claims. Regarding
potential violation of his right to confrontation, a defendant spec-
ulates that the counseling records contain statements of the victim
which the defendant might use to impeach her testimony at trial.
Regarding his rights under the compulsory process clause, a defen-
dant speculates that the files contain exculpatory evidence or that
432 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the private function
theory of testimonial privileges.
133 1n re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 60-62, 428 A.2d at 149-50 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
4" Id. at 55-56, 428 A.2d at 146-47 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
93 1d. at 38, 428 A,2d at 138. (Larsen, J., dissenting); HILBERMAN, ,supra note 3, at 36.
See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. •
43" See In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 53, 428 A,2d at 145 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
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the counselor knows facts relating to the defendant's guilt or in-
nocence. The compelling public and private interests supporting an
absolute privilege should not be destroyed by the defendant's mere
conjecture.
The Supreme Court decision of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie also sup-
ports the conclusion that an absolute privilege is constitutional. An
absolute statute protecting the rape crisis counseling relationship is
also distinguishable from the statute at issue in Ritchie because the
statute in Ritchie provided several exceptions that would allow some
disclosure in criminal trials. 437 The Ritchie court itself noted this
distinction, citing Pennsylvania's unqualified privilege for commu-
nications between sexual assault counselors and victims as an ex-
ample of an absolute privilege. 438
 As the Court recognized, the
absolute statute prevents disclosure under all circumstances:m
Thus, an absolute statute reflects a state policy and commitment
against disclosure that is more compelling than the policy displayed
by the qualified statute protecting the CYS files in Ritchie.'" Ac-
cordingly, the expressed legislative intent against disclosure and the
private interests underlying the privilege distinguish the absolute
privilege for rape counseling from the situation in Ritchie.
Although Ritchie involved only a qualified privilege, the Su-
preme Court still concluded that the state's interests in the confi-
dentiality of the CYS files required an in camera review, rather than
complete disclosure."' The Court found that only public interests—
investigation and prosecution of child abuse—supported the statute
protecting the CYS's files.'" Nevertheless, the Court determined
that an in camera review, rather than complete disclosure, was nec-
essary to accommodate these interests. 443
 In contrast to the statute
protecting the CYS's files, a testimonial privilege is supported by
both public and private interests. Consequently, more protection
than an in camera review is necessary to adequately guard the inter-
ests supporting an absolute privilege for rape crisis counseling.
Although a qualified privilege providing for an in camera review
may appear to be an adequate resolution of the competing interests,
' 17
 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1002; Foggy, 121 III. 2d at 347, 521 N.E.2d at.
91,
138
 Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1002,
499 Id.
41" See id.
431 Id, at 1003.
442 Id,
443 Id.
474	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:411
a qualified privilege is ineffective in the rape counseling situation
and does not adequately protect the victim's privacy interests. 444
Even the minor threat that one judge may review her private com-
munications may inhibit the victim either from obtaining treatment
or from continuing with the prosecution of the defendant. Neither
result is desirable. Moreover, this threat of disclosure is increased
by the possibility that additional judges will review the file on ap-
peal.445
A victim will be unable to trust a judge to determine if the
communications include exculpatory evidence or statements that
the defense might use for impeachment. Because the common emo-
tions experienced by a rape victim include guilt, self-blame and
shame, the counselor's files will undoubtably contain a victim's ex-
pressions of such emotions. A trial judge, uneducated as to the
common reactions of rape victims, might easily identify such state-
ments as exculpatory evidence or impeaching statements. Conse-
quently, a qualified privilege providing for an in camera review
proves ineffective in protecting the public and private interests
supporting a privilege for rape counseling. Nothing less than an
absolute privilege will adequately protect a victim's privacy interests
and promote the social goals that the relationship serves. Accord-
ingly, an absolute privilege for communications between a rape
victim and a rape crisis counselor is constitutional; the public and
private interests supporting the privilege justify any speculative
infringement on the defendant's rights to confrontation and com-
pulsory process under the sixth amendment.
CONCLUSION
Rape scars a victim for life, wounding her physically, emotion-
ally and psychologically. To enable rape victims to recover from the
trauma they suffer, rape crisis centers provide confidential thera-
peutic counseling to victims through personal counselors specifically
trained in rape counseling. Several state legislatures have enacted
testimonial privileges to protect the confidentiality of communica-
tions arising from the rape counseling relationship. An absolute
privilege protects a victim's privacy interests in the relationship and
in the confidences she shares with her counselor. The privilege also
4" In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 61,428 A.2c1 at 149-50 (Larsen, J., dissenting); Fuggy, 121
2d at 349-50,521 N.E.2c1 at 92.
"5 In re Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 61,428 A.2d at 149-50 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
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fosters society's interests in the rehabilitation of rape victims and
the prosecution of rapists. Criminal defendants charged with rape,
however, have alleged that an absolute privilege protecting rape
counseling communications violates their constitutional rights to
confrontation and compulsory process under the sixth amendment.
This note has analyzed the constitutionality of an absolute priv-
ilege for rape counseling. To date, the Supreme Court has not
addressed whether an absolute testimonial privilege for rape coun-
seling violates a criminal defendant's constitutional rights. In the
Supreme Court decision of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the Court did
analyze the constitutionality of a qualified statute, protecting the
files of a child abuse agency. The Court concluded that the statute
did not violate a defendant's confrontation rights, but that a defen-
dant's due process rights required an in camera review of the files.
In other Supreme Court decisions, the Court has considered con-
flicts between evidentiary rules of exclusion and a defendant's sixth
amendment rights. Addressing these conflicts, the Court has out-
lined the parameters of a defendant's rights of confrontation and
compulsory process under the sixth amendment.
In contrast to the Supreme Court, various state courts have
analyzed the constitutionality of an absolute privilege for rape crisis
counseling. Although these courts relied on the same Supreme
Court decisions involving the confrontation and compulsory process
clauses, their interpretations of these decisions and their ultimate
conclusions differ. Most of these state courts decided the issue be-
fore the Ritchie decision and held an absolute statute unconstitu-
tional. The one state court deciding the issue after Ritchie, however,
ruled that the absolute privilege for rape counseling did not violate
a defendant's constitutional rights.
This note similarly concludes that an absolute privilege for the
rape crisis counseling relationship does not violate a defendant's
right to confrontation and compulsory process under the sixth
amendment. The right of confrontation, as outlined by a plurality
of the Supreme Court in Ritchie, is a trial right that requires only
that a defendant receive an unrestricted opportunity to cross-ex-
amine a witness at trial. Because the absolute privilege does not
restrict cross-examination questioning at trial, the privilege does not
infringe upon a defendant's right of confrontation. If the confron-
tation clause ultimately requires defense access to a victim's state-
ments to use in cross-examination, as the dissent in Ritchie argued,
an absolute privilege would still survive constitutional scrutiny be-
cause, under a balancing analysis, the private and public interests
476	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 30:411
supporting the privilege justify any speculative infringement on a
defendant's right of confrontation. Similarly, an absolute privilege
for rape counseling is constitutional under the sixth amendment
compulsory process clause. Upon weighing the competing consid-
erations, an absolute privilege's potential infringement on a defen-
dant's compulsory process rights is warranted by the private and
public interests which the privilege protects. In sum, an absolute
privilege for rape crisis counseling is constitutional.
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